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1 INTRODUCTION

The 1911 Revolution and the transformation of China from empire to republic were the most
significant issues facing early twentieth-century Chinese leaders. Following the 1911 Revolution,
Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) was elected by the Provisional Senate as the provisional president of
China. This election was later ratified by an imperial decree of the Qing court, and on March 10,
1912, Yuan assumed the post of provisional president in Beijing. 1 In February of the following
year, democratic elections were held for the newly founded National Assembly of China. And in
October of that year, in the first formal presidential election in China’s history, the National
Assembly elected Yuan as president of the Republic. However, in December 1915, he
proclaimed himself hereditary emperor of a constitutional monarchy. This plot abruptly failed,
and on June 6, 1916, Yuan died in humiliation. In fact, Yuan Shikai’s plot did not come out of
the blue. In the early twentieth century most of China’s ruling elites engaged in plans to build a
constitutional monarchy under the Qing. However, Yuan’s failure to carry out his version of
constitutional monarchy in 1915-1916 marked the end of this effort. Yuan’s attempt to establish
a constitutional monarchy, and its subsequent failure, remains a rich topic for historical analysis .
This thesis argues that the belief that China’s unity was only be preserved by centralizing
authority through a constitutional monarchy and the influential thinking of Yang Du (18751931), a monarchist and advisor to Yuan, spelled out in his April 1915 treatise “National

In fact, Yuan was the second provisional president of the Republic. On December 29, 1911,
representatives from the provinces of China met in Nanjing and elected Sun Yat-sen (who became
publicly acclaimed as “the father of the Republic”) as the first provisional president. Yuan arranged for
the abdication of the Qing emperor, Xuantong (aka Puyi), on February 12, 1912, supposedly in return for
the understanding that Yuan would be made president of the Republic. Then, Sun stepped down as the
provisional president, and, as discussed later in the thesis, Yuan became the new provisional president on
March 10, 1912.
1
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Salvation through Constitutional Monarchy,” 2 were the most important factors in Yuan Shikai’s
decision to restore the monarchy.
The thesis explores why Yuan Shikai persisted in his support for constitutional monarchy in
1915, a decision that led to the abrupt failure of his presidency and the tragic ending of his
political career and, indeed, his life. This study focuses on the key actors of the failed
restoration—Yuan and his advisor Yang Du—their ideas and actions, and the internal dynamics
of the failed attempt at restoration. Yang Du’s thought on constitutional monarchy was not
without opposition. The liberal intellectual Liang Qichao (1873–1929) published a paper to
refute Yang’s arguments in August 1915, warning that Yang’s notions could mislead the
president and bring China to disaster. 3 The two opposing views were clearly and forcefully
expressed to Yuan Shikai and the Chinese people through two widely noted essays at that time.
Although they disagreed over whether a presidential republic or a constitutional monarchy was
the best path for China, both Yang Du and Liang Qichao insisted that China’s historical tradition
of centralized authority should be maintained and the developing trend toward provincialism
following the 1911 Revolution should be stopped. After four and a half years of the republican
experiment, Yuan Shikai came to believe that only a strong, constitutional central government
could unify China. Therefore, he took the risky path of centralizing authority in China through a
constitutional monarchy, a requirement for adopting constitutionalism in his perspective.
Yuan Shikai, a leading figure in China’s transition from a monarchy to a republic, and the
historical events that swirled around him, have always been key issues in the study of modern
Chinese history. With the evolution of the two keynotes of modern Chinese history —revolution

Yang Du, “Junxian jiu guo lun” (National salvation through constitutional monarchy), HGWX, vol. 2:
1018.
3 Liang Qichao, “Yi zhe suowei guoti wenti zhe” (Another view on the so-called state structure question)
1915, HGWX, vol. 1: 258–272.
2
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and reform—the reappraisal and analysis of Yuan Shikai and his role in modern Chinese history
have also undergone sweeping change. The 1911 Revolution overthrew the Qing dynasty and
transformed China from an empire to a republic, after which Yuan attempted to turn the country
into a constitutional monarchy with himself as hereditary emperor. This action was opposed not
only by revolutionaries and constitutionalists, but also by the Beiyang clique,4 a powerful
military group that Yuan had fostered, and which served as his power base. After Yuan’s death
in 1916, the Beiyang clique lost its center and gradually became internally divided, which
eventually led to the civil wars between the warlords that plagued China during the first decades
of the Republic. 5 As a result, revolutionary forces that opposed the Beiyang warlords gradually
developed and stepped onto the center of the historical stage. Therefore, as a target of the
revolutionary struggle after 1919, Yuan Shikai was portrayed as dictator, the father of the
warlords, and the destroyer of the nascent republican system.6 As a reflection of this situation,
during most of the twentieth century, many historians evaluated Yuan Shikai as a figure who,
driven by personal ambition, “turned back the historical clock” (kai li shi dao che).7

The Beiyang clique, also known as the “Beiyang warlord group,” was composed of the main generals of
the Beiyang New Army, which had been trained by Yuan Shikai, serving as the commander of the military
training base at Xiaozhan, in the city of Tianjin, North China, in the late Qing dynasty. This “Xiaozhan
troop training,” as it came to be called, was intended to lay the basis for a thoroughly modern officer corp.
On the Xiaozhan troop training, see Hong Zhang, “Yuan Shikai and the Significance of His Troop
Training at Xiaozhan, Tianjin, 1895–1899,” Chinese Historical Review 26, no. 1 (January 2019): 37–54,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1547402X.2019.1583920.
5 The warlord era in China, is usually dated 1916–1928, that is beginning with the death of Yuan Shikai
and ending with establishment of the Guomindang Nationalist government in 1928 (although warlords
continued to plague China after 1928). For more on the warlord era, see the review essay by Diana Lary,
“Warlord Studies,” Modern China vol. 6, no. 4 (October 1980): 439–470,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/189036?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
6 See, for example, Chen Boda, Jieshao qie guo da dao Yuan Shikai (An introduction to the national
usurper Yuan Shikai), (Zhangjiakou: Jinchaji ribaoshe, 1946), 52–63.
7 Su Quanyou and He Kewei, Yuan Shikai zhuan (Biography of Yuan Shikai), (Hangzhou: Zhejiang daxue
chubanshe, 2013), 412.
4
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Since the 1980s, however, Yuan Shikai and his life have been subject to reinterpretation as
Chinese historians began to work through the primary source material created by Yuan and his
Beiyang clique. 8 Historians have begun to seek a more comprehensive explanation for Yuan
Shikai’s actions, shifting from simple political judgment to objective historical analysis. Indeed,
the field has gradually come to recognize Yuan Shikai’s contributions to and positive influence
on the course of modern Chinese history.9 The emerging consensus among scholars is that
Yuan’s restoration was driven not solely by his personal ambition but also by important external
factors, like aggressive Japan.10 Many historians agree that the restoration of the monarchy was a
fundamental failure for which Yuan Shikai bears responsibility.11 And many historians recognize
that his failure not only led to a national disaster but also amounted to a tragic end of his
otherwise celebrated career.12 Nevertheless, Yuan’s restoration is still stigmatized in China, both
in academia and among the general public.
Although most scholars in China have broken free from the past revolutionary dogma, they
still have been cautious in expressing their views on this topic.13 The time is ripe for a forthright
and comprehensive analysis of Yuan and his decision to restore the monarchy . Utilizing the
influential treatises of Yuan’s advisors Yang Du (1875–1931), Liang Qichao (1873–1929), and
Frank Johnson Goodnow (1859–1939), which published in 1915 and other, mostly primary,
materials on Yuan Shikai’s presidency, this thesis investigates Yuan Shikai’s decision to

Luo Baoshan, Luo Baoshan pingdian Yuan Shikai handu (Luo Baoshan’s comments on Yuan Shikai’s
correspondence), (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2005), 228.
9 Luo Baoshan and Liu Lusheng, “Yuan Shikai yu Xinhai geming” (Yuan Shikai and the 1911
Revolution), Shixue yue kan (History Monthly) 3, (2012): 77–83.
10 Su Quanyou, Yuan Shikai chengdi yuanyin shixi (An analysis of the reasons why Yuan Shikai
proclaimed himself emperor), (Hangzhou: Zhejiang daxue chubanshe, 2015), 37–38.
11 Li Zongyi, Yuan Shikai zhuan (Biography of Yuan Shikai), (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), 260, 266,
277, 278.
12 Patrick Fuliang Shan, Yuan Shikai: A Reappraisal (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018), 210.
13 Ibid.
8
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entrench centralized authority by establishing a constitutional monarchy. In response to the same
conditions, centralism and constitutionalism had become the common objective of Yuan and his
three important advisors. This thesis, in short, explores the intellectual background to Yuan
Shikai’s four and a half years presidency and his ill-fated decision to proclaim a constitutional
monarchy.
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2

YUAN’S EXPERIENCE: CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENTS IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC

Yuan Shikai’s presidency was an experiment in reforming the country’s political system
under the first wave of Chinese nationalism. After the 1911 Revolution and four and a half years
China: A New History of the early republic, Yuan eventually made his decision, based on his
experiences and his strategy, to end the liberal republic and establish a constitutional
monarchy.14 To understand why Yuan insisted on political centralism and chose to establish a
constitutional monarchy requires understanding his experiences in the first years of republican
period.

2.1

China’s Sole Indispensable Man in the 1911 Revolution
The 1911 Revolution was a watershed of titanic proportions in Chinese history. It not only

brought to an end the nearly three-century-old Qing dynasty, but also more than two millennia of
imperial rule. As the empire died, a new republic was born, the first in Asia. In the wake of this
cataclysmic event, there was no consensus among the Chinese people about what the nature and
policies of the new republican regime should be. Yet, there was agreement on one crucial point:
the Chinese nation faced an existential threat. Fear for the survival of the Chinese nation was
born from a widely shared understanding of the f inal decades of the empire: since the middle of
the nineteenth century, China had fallen prey to foreign imperialism; its dignity and sovereignty
assaulted; its economy backward and uncompetitive on the world stage; and its people and

14

John K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12 Republican China, 1912–1949, Part 1
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), see Chapter 4, “Yuan Shikai on the Issues,” 225–228.
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institutions were weak—perhaps fatally so. What was needed was a national rejuvenation, a way
of infusing the nation with strength and determination and creating a basis for stability and
prosperity. But on the question of how this could be achieved there was no agreement.
From this point of view, the 1911 revolution was a consequence of the Qing’s failure to
resist invasion and its seeming incapacity to foster constitutionalism. 15 And the revolution
succeeded not because of a bloody uprising but because of a developing sense of consensus and
spirit of compromise for which Yuan Shikai was the main motive force. Through political
compromise, all political forces, including revolutionaries, constitutionalists, and the Qing royal
household, had finally found new positions in the new era of the Republic of China. Historian
John Fairbank argues that, in the 1911 Revolution,
There was general agreement that China must have a parliament to represent the
provinces, that unity was necessary to forestall foreign intervention, and that the reformminded Yuan Shikai, Li Hongzhang’s successor and chief trainer of China’s new army,
was the one man with the capacity to head the government. Though a noteworthy series
of compromises, China avoided both prolonged civil war and peasant risin gs as well as
foreign intervention.” 16
At that time, no one rebuked Yuan Shikai as a “national usurper.”17 On the contrary, Yuan Shikai
had solved China’s immediate political conflict through negotiations between the Qing court and
the republican revolutionaries. Patrick Shan concludes in his book that,
…most scholars now agree that the collapse of the Qing was the result of the diverse
political forces, including the actions of the revolutionaries, the Constitutionalists, the
Beiyang troops, and others. It was those combined forces (heli) working together that
Constitutionalism was the mainstream in political thought in China in the final years of the Qing and
the initial years of the Republic. As the historian Peter Zarrow puts it, “constitutionalism was a marginal
notion in the 1880s, became a focus of radical attention in the 1890s, and finally turned into the
mainstream in the course of the Qing’s ‘new policy’ reforms ... beginning in 1902.” Peter Zarrow,
“Constitutionalism and the Imagination of the State: Official Views of Political Reform in the Late Qing,”
in Peter Zarrow (ed.), Creating Chinese Modernity: Knowledge and Everyday Life, 1900–1940 (New
York: Peter Lang, 2007), 51–82, here 51.]].
16 John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press,
1991), 250.
17 Chen Boda, Jieshao qie guo da dao Yuan Shikai, 62.
15

8
brought about imperial abdication. It must be noted that all of those forces h ad chosen
Yuan as the national leader, believing that he could stabilize the nation, for he had
experience in running a state. Thus, Yuan came to power through a political
compromise.18
In other words, Yuan Shikai— “China’s sole indispensable man” (fei Yuan mo shu)—offered a
path to stability that was, arguably, the consensus of the people of China at that time. 19

2.2

China’s First Elected President and the Early Republic
As the provisional president elected by the Nanjing Provisional Senate on February 13,

1912, the day after the Qing emperor announced his abdication, Yuan Shikai declared that,
“republicanism is the best state system, a fact that has already being recognized around the
world,” and “From now on, we shall make great efforts to set republicanism on a secure footing
and ensure that the monarchy will never come back to China again.” 20 On March 10, 1912, Yuan
Shikai assumed his post as provisional president and publicly swore to “Promote the spirit of
republicanism, clean up the flaws of autocracy, and abide by the constitution.” 21 Although Yuan
pledged allegiance to the constitution, the implementation of the Provisional Constitution in the
early Republic ran into serious political difficulties. In this environment, Yuan Shikai and the
reformist Progressive Party, which had been founded by Liang Qichao in 1913, criticized the
Provisional Constitution for restricting the executive power of the president and hobbling

18

Shan, Yuan Shikai: A Reappraisal, 163–164.
Zhang Huateng, “Wo kan Yuan Shikai” (My view on Yuan Shikai), Yuan Shikai yu Qingmo minchu
shehui biange yanjiu (Yuan Shikai and social change in the late Qing and early Republic), (Beijing:
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2017), 13–30.
20 Shan, Yuan Shikai: A Reappraisal, 166–68.
21 Luo Baoshan and Liu Lusheng, “Linshi dangzong tong shici,” (The Oath of the Provisional President),
Yuan Shikai quanji (The complete works of Yuan Shikai) (Zhengzhou: Henan daxue chubanshe, 2012),
vol.19: 626.
19
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administrative efficiency. The solution, in the eyes of Yuan and the Progressive Party, was to
amend the constitution to strengthen the power of the president. 22
In the context of political upheaval and confusion over the role of the executive in a
constitutional system, political philosophers in China began to weigh the various options. Some
would come to embrace a strong and centralized authority; others promoted an executive whose
powers would be divided. As the leader of the Progressive Party, Liang Qichao hoped that the
constitution would be amended to strengthen the power of the president through an act by the
National Assembly, establishing a presidential republicanism to replace the cabinet republican
system. But the assassination of Song Jiaoren (1882–1913), a republican revolutionary and a
founder of the Guomindang (Nationalist Party), in 1913 led to an immediate deterioration in the
political atmosphere. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), the leader of the Guomindang, launched a socalled Second Revolution (March–November 1913), an attempt to topple Yuan Shikai and the
Beiyang clique. However, Yuan quickly suppressed the uprising, causing Sun Yat-sen to flee to
Japan.23 After the failure of the Second Revolution, with the support of Liang Qichao’s
Progressive Party, in October 1913 the National Assembly elected Yuan Shikai as the formal
president. In March 1914, Yuan convened a meeting to formulate a constitution, which stipulated
that the president was “responsible to the whole nation,” and that the administration of the
national government was to be headed by the president, assisted by the secretary of state. On
May 1, 1914, with the support of Liang Qichao’s Progressive Party, a new constitution, which
enshrined a presidential republican system, was passed and promulgated.24

Shan, Yuan Shikai: A Reappraisal, 170–171.
Ibid., 174–175.
24 Ibid., 190–191.
22
23
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2.3

Political Centralism and the Abrupt Failure of the Restoration
With his election as the formal president and the promulgation of a new constitution, Yuan

Shikai had already moved on from the first stage of the republican experiment: he had learne d to
manage power in the context of the republican system. The failure of the Second Revolution
launched by Sun Yat-sen in 1913 and the subsequent weakening of the Guomindang allowed the
Progressive Party headed by Liang Qichao to assume a leading position in the National
Assembly. Furthermore, with the Beiyang forces (which were led by Yuan Shikai) replacing the
leadership of the four provinces that had been previously dominated by Guomindang, the
military and administrative powers of almost all the provinces fell into the hands of Yuan Shikai.
The authority of the central government and a new financial system had been established, and the
country’s general situation turned from chaos to relatively effective governance by end of
1914.25
This situation changed dramatically in 1915. The outbreak of the First World War gave
Japan an opportunity to greatly expand its influence in China and led to an aggressive strategy
against China. On January 18, 1915, Japan presented Yuan Shikai with its so -called Twenty-One
Demands, which, if accepted, would greatly extend Japanese control of China. 26 The Chinese
government attempted to negotiate and stall, but with Japanese troops in place and faced with a
Japanese ultimatum on May 8, 1915, Yuan decided to accept the final f orm of the demands,
excluding the most humiliating demand, that China surrender control over its finances. 27 It was

Ibid., 177–178.
The Twenty-One Demands called for, among other things, confirming Japan’s recent seizure of
Germany’s concessions in the province of Shandong, extending Japan’s sphere of influence in Manchuria,
giving Japan control of a mining and metallurgical complex in central China, barring China from granting
further concessions to European powers, and, most troubling, in effect surrendering control over China’s
finances and police to Japan.
27 Shan, Yuan Shikai: A Reappraisal, 197–199.
25
26
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largely in reaction to the crisis created by Japan’s demands that Yang Du wrote his famous
treatise “National Salvation through Constitutional Monarchy” in April 1915 and submitted it to
Yuan.28 In this work, as we shall see in Chapter 3, Yuan Shikai found a way to legitimize his
strategic plan to centralize authority. And then, in August 1915, Yang Du launched the Peace
Planning Society (Chouanhui), which directly called for establishing a constitutional monarchy
in China.29 Yuan Shikai responded on December 12, 1915, by “accepting” the position of
emperor of China. It is telling that the reign name Yuan chose reflected his intention not to
become dictator but a constitutional monarch: Hongxian, literally meaning “Constitutional
Abundance.” 30 Yuan’s attempted coup generated widespread opposition and ultimately was not
accepted by the Chinese people. Although Yuan had not formally ascended the throne, on March
22, 1916, in the face of fierce and widespread opposition to his coup, he publicly declared th e
abolition of the monarchy. Yuan died in deep humiliation, sorrow, and regret on June 6, 1916.
The farcical attempt to lay the ground for restoring the monarchy lasted nearly a year, from 1915
to 1916.31

Ibid., 213.
Ibid., 213–214.
30 Ibid., 216.
31 Ibid., 238–239.
28
29

12
3

YUAN’S ADVISORS: THE INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE
RESTORATION

Although the restoration was a complete failure, Yang Du maintained his belief in
constitutional monarchy. In May 1916 he publicly declared, “I was mainly responsible for the
bringing about of the movement, and ... I do not intend, neither have I any desire, to shirk my
responsibility of so doing.” 32 His words did indeed reflect his role in the restoration, and in
hindsight, one can say that Yang Du was the chief intellectual force behind the restoration of the
monarchy.

3.1

Yang Du: Political Centralism through Constitutional Monarchy

3.1.1 The Chief Force Behind the Restoration of Monarchy
Yang Du, passed the keju, the highest imperial examination, in 1895 and earned second place
in 1903 in the new special examinations on Western knowledge established by the Qing court.
He went to Japan in 1902 to study constitutional politics and became an organizer of Chinese
students in Japan, who at that time represented a wide variety of political persuasions. During his
stay in Japan, he became convinced that the solution to the chaos in China in the early years of
the twentieth century lay in adopting constitutional monarchy. In defense of his views, Yang
debated with many well-known Chinese political figures. The most famous exchange was a

Ernest P. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k’ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican
China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), 223.
32
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three-day and three-night debate in 1903 with Sun Yat-sen on whether China should adopt a
democratic republican system or a constitutional monarchy. 33
In 1905, Empress Dowager Cixi (1836–1908) sent five ministers to visit Japan and twelve
Western countries as part of the preparations for constitutional reform. The five ministers visited
Yang Du and persuaded him to draft articles on constitutionalism. Yang Du wrote “An Outline
of Constitutional Government of China: Absorbing the Strengths of the Eastern and Western
Countries” and “Implementing Constitutional Procedures,” and asked his close friend Liang
Qichao to write “A Comparison of Constitutional Governments in Eastern and Western
Countries.” 34 The five ministers presented these texts to Cixi in the concluding report of their
mission. Based on this report the Qing court officially promulgated an edict in 1906 mandating
extensive reforms—known collectively as the Xinzheng (or New Policies) reforms—including
initiating steps toward constitutionalism and a constitutional monarchy. In July 1907, Yang Du
initiated the establishment of the Association for Constitutional Government, an organization to
promote constitutionalism, which was later approved by the Qing court, and he directly wrote to
the court asking that “a parliament be established,” which became a landmark event in China’s
constitutional development. In April 1908, Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong, the most influential
of China’s governors-general at that time, jointly recommended Yang Du to the court as a
“specialist in the constitution, [whose] ability can be of great use.” 35 The court thereafter
appointed Yang as an official to preside over the Constitutional Compilation Office, essentially a

Apparently, there is no adequate English-language biography of Yang Du aside from one on Wikipedia:
https://en .m.wikipedia.org/wiki.
34 See “杨度” (Yang Du),” Baidu Baike, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%9D%A8%E5%BA%A6.
35 Ibid. Also see https://zh.m.wikipedia.org/wiki%E6%9D%A8%E5%BA%A6. Throughout the thesis all
translations from Chinese language sources are mine unless indicated otherwise.
33

14
think tank. Yang Du drafted most of the Qing government’s constitutional documents and was
recognized as the chief spokesman and designer of the late Qing constitution.
Yang Du was an opponent of the republican system, and as such he rejected Yuan Shikai’s
invitation to serve in the republican government after the 1911 Revolution. Upon the death of
Yuan Shikai, without expressing any regret for his own behavior, Yang Du b lamed Yuan Shikai
for so quickly giving up the attempt to establish a constitutional monarchy: “Is it the
constitutional monarchy that needs to say sorry to Ming Gong [a wise leader, here referring to
Yuan Shikai], or is it Ming Gong who needs to say he is sorry to the constitutional monarchy?
Even if you [Yuan Shikai] are dead, you should ask yourself this question again and again . Is the
Republic wrong for China, or is China wrong for the Republic? Only after a hundred years it will
become clear.” 36 In Yang’s view, Yuan and his associates had failed China by not implementing
constitutional monarchy, the only path to national salvation. Even though Yuan had already paid
the price of his life for the restoration, as the leader, he should have felt guilty for not fulfilling
his responsibility. As for the liberal republican system, Yang further stressed his understanding
that, regardless of whether the system was flawed or China lacked the necessary conditions,
history would prove that it could not be realized in China. But it might take a hundred years for
people to really recognize this truth. 37

As Yang Du’s original Chinese texts (君宪负明公, 明公负君宪, 九泉之下三复斯言; 共和误民国, 民
国误共和, 百年而后再评是狱.) can be found in https://www.baidu.com. For further study can see Ma
Yong, (青梅煮酒论英雄: 马勇评近代史人物. 马勇, Publisher: Beijing Book Co. Inc., 2014.) See
https://books.google.com/books?id=2s3UDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT80&ots=QCTJN6ngv3&dq=%E5%90%9
B%E5%AE%AA%E8%B4%9F%E6%98%8E%E5%85%AC%EF%BC%8C%E6%98%8E%E5%85%AC
%E8%B4%9F%E5%90%9B%E5%AE%AA&pg=PT81#v=onepage&q=%E5%90%9B%E5%AE%AA%
E8%B4%9F%E6%98%8E%E5%85%AC%EF%BC%8C%E6%98%8E%E5%85%AC%E8%B4%9F%E5
%90%9B%E5%AE%AA&f=false
37 Ibid.
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Following this criticism of Yuan Shikai, Yang fled to the mountains to study Buddhism, and
he declined entreaties to return to public life. And yet, in the autumn of 1929, in what seemed to
be a supreme irony, he applied for membership in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), during
its most fragile period, and became a secret member. Yang Du died in July 1931 at the age of
57.38 The eventual success of the Communist Party in 1949, and the “socialist path” blazed by
the party thereafter amounted to a rejection of the sort of liberal republicanism of the early
Republic in favor of political centralism. Thus, in a sense, the Communist Party was the agent
that brought to culmination Yang Du’s and Yuan Shikai’s quest for political centralism in the
early years of the Republic. To that extent, what transpired after 1949 demonstrated that there
was a certain rationality inherent in Yang’s and Yuan’s position. Here, one might say that in
Yang’s view, the current Chinese socialism could be an alternative to Yang’s constitutional
monarchy, and could be a path to his final objective, achieving national salvation through
establishing a strong centralized government.

3.1.2 “National Salvation through Constitutional Monarchy”
In his famous 1915 treatise “National Salvation through Constitutional Monarchy,” 39 Yang
once again appealed to Yuan and Chinese people, explaining that the only way to save China
was to take the road of constitutional monarchy. Yang, writing as “Mr. Tiger” in the essay,
See https://zh.m.wikipedia.org/wiki%E6%9D%A8%E5%BA%A6. Only can study the biography of
Yang Du by Chinese version.
39 For an English translation of “National Salvation through Constitutional Monarchy,” see Putnam
Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China, (Good Press, 2019), Chapter VIII, “The Monarchy Plot: The
Pamphlet of Yang,” 158–180. In Putnam Weale’s work, Yang’s essay is titled “A Defence of the
Monarchical Movement,” 123–142. All the quotations in this paragraph are from this source. The original
of Yang’s essay, “Junxian jiu guo lun” (君宪救国论), can be found in the Chinese version of Putnam
Weale’s book, 帕特南·威尔 (Putnam Weale), Diguo mengyan: Luan shi Yuan Shikai (帝国梦魇：乱世
袁世凯) (Imperial nightmare: Yuan Shikai in troubled times), (Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe,
2005), 113–129.
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declared that if China adhered to the republican system, it had no hope of becoming strong and
wealthy, nor of having a real constitutional government. “No! No! If China does not make any
change in the form of government, there is no hope for her becoming strong and rich; there is
even no hope for her having a constitutional government. I say that China [in that case] is
doomed to perish.” 40 Then he went straight to his main theme, pointing out that it was a major
mistake for the 1911 Revolution to embark on the road of republicanism: “The republican form
of government is responsible [for China’s dire fate]. … No plan to save the country is possible.
The formation of the Republic as a result of the first revolution has prevented that.” 41 He started
his essay with a question from an imaginary “Guest” (“Ke”) and explained his thinking
concerning three points, to which we now turn.

3.1.2.1 The Republic: No Hope of China’s Becoming Strong or Rich
First, Yang Du points out that there was no hope of China becoming strong since “the people
of a republic are accustomed to listening to talk of equality and freedom, which must affect the
political and more especially the military administration.”42 Yang mentions that soldiers should
observe strict discipline and obey the orders of their superiors, but the new republican ideas of
“equality and freedom” would destroy the old customs of “discipline” and “obedience.” 43 Yang
takes the troops in southern China, the stronghold of republicanism, as an example. When an
important decision needed to be made, the republican soldiers always demanded a voice and a
role in decision making. As a result, officers had to obey their subordinate officers and the
subordinate officers had to obey their soldiers. Yang Du further points out that such troops could

Yang Du, “A Defence of the Monarchical Movement,” 124; Yang Du, “Junxian jiu guo lun,” 112.
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42 Ibid.
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not protect China in the face of internal and external threats. Since China, a republican state, was
situated between Japan and Russia, two monarchical states, China could not resist their
aggression and was fated to be subjugated. Therefore, in Yang’s view, if China followed the path
of republicanism, it had no hope of becoming strong. 44
Second, Yang explains why there was also no hope of China’s becoming rich. “If any nation
wishes to become rich, it must depend upon industries for its wealth. Now, what industries most
fear is disorder and civil war.” 45 Yang emphasizes that the republican system would cause social
instability, especially through frequent changes in the president. And this in turn would
hamstring the sustained development of industry and commerce. In Yang’s view, although the
long-term stability of China required the development of industries, liberal republicanism
undercut that goal by sowing social unrest. If the Republic continued, economic conditions
would decline. Therefore, he explains, there was no hope of China’s becoming rich.
Third, Yang Du suggests that there was also no hope for China having a constitutional
government. He mentions the reality at that time that few Chinese people really knew what a
republic was, what a constitution was, and what constituted the idea of “equality and freedom.” 46
Yang Du further suggests that the demise of the monarchy led to the loss of central authority. He
used the Second Revolution as an example to illustrate the negative influence on the country:
“Having overthrown the empire and established in its place a republic they [the people] believe
that from now on they are subservient to no one, and they think they can do as they please.
Ambitious men hold that any person may be president and if they cannot get the presidency by

Yang Du, “A Defence of the Monarchical Movement,” 124–125; Yang Du, “Junxian jiu guo lun,” 112–
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45 All the quotations in this paragraph are from Yang Du, “A Defence of the Monarchical Movement,”
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fair means through election, they are prepared to fight for it with the assistance of troops and
thieves. The Second Revolution is an illustration of this point.” 47 Yang Du believed that no
matter who was the head of state, only autocracy could ensure unified governance and internal
security: “In short, China’s republic must be governed by a monarchy through a constitutional
government. If the constitutional government cannot govern the republic, the latter cannot
remain.”48 That is to say, at the time Yang wrote, he believed China should be governed by a
monarch acting through a constitutional government. At the same time, Yang Du emphasizes the
importance of constitutionalism to the long-term development of the country, including in such
fields as education, industry, and the military. He points out that the formation of a constitutional
system inevitably will take decades of persistent effort. However, under a republican system,
presidents often served only a short time and there were many disputes between different
presidents and different parties, and thus national policies were always contradictory and
changeable. Even a promising president could only have a short-term effect under a republican
system. In short, as a devoted constitutionalist, establishing a constitutional govern ment was
Yang Du’s ultimate goal, while the actual situation he observed in the early Republic
increasingly deviated from that direction. Therefore, in Yang’s view, there was no hope for
China to establish a truly constitutional government.

3.1.2.2 Constitutional Monarchy: A Requirement for Adopting Constitutionalism
Yang Du also argues that national salvation involves two steps: “In short, the country cannot
be saved except through the establishment of a constitutional form of government. No
constitutional government can be formed except through the establishment of a monarchy. The
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constitutional form of government has a set of fixed laws, and the monarchy has a definite head
who cannot be changed, in which matters lies the source of national strength and wealth.”49 Yang
Du believed that in order to make the country wealthy and strong required the adoption of a
constitutional government since long-term development can only be achieved on the basis of a
stable legal system rather than relying on the individuals’ ability. To establish a constitutional
government, China should first establish a monarchy, which would ensure stability since the
head of the country would remain unchanged. In Yang’s view, the monarchical system, without
the competition over the national leadership as in the republican system, was a prerequisite for
constitutionalism.
Yang Du further points out the relationship between “wealth and strength” and the
constitutional system, arguing that wealth and strength were the goals o f the nation, whereas the
constitutional system was the only means to achieve these goals. 50 To support his argument,
Yang analyzes thousands of years of Chinese history, concluding that although there were many
great and wise emperors, their achievements had never achieved permanence, thus making it
difficult to sustain the stability of the country. Japan in particular drew his attention in this
regard: “Japan was never known as a strong nation until she adopted a constitutional
government. The reason is this: when there is no constitutional government, the country cannot
continue to carry out a definite policy.”51 He concludes that the Japanese case, in contrast to
China’s long monarchical history, showed that only by establishing a constitutional system c ould
a country maintain consistent policies and thus develop in the long run. Thus, Yang believed that
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the establishment of a constitutional government was a fundamental requirement for ensuring the
long-term “wealth and strength” of any country.
Yang Du also explains that the core element of a constitutional government is the rule of law.
“It is a government with a set of fixed laws which guard the actions of both the people and the
president none of whom can overstep the boundary as specified in the laws. No ruler, whether he
be a good man or a bad man, can change one iota of the laws. The people reap the benefit of this
in consequence.”52 Yang believed that it was easy to make a country strong and prosperous, but
very difficult to establish a constitutional government. He predicts that after the establishment of
a constitutional government, everything would take care of itself, and strength and prosperity
would follow as a matter of course.
Yang repeatedly points out that the fundamental problem of a republican system lies in the
fact that the method for selecting the head of state would inevitably lead to war in China at that
time: “If the present system continues there will be intermittent trouble. At every change of the
president there will be riot and civil war.” 53 In short, in Yang’s opinion, constitutionalism is
source of long-term stability. But under a liberal republican system, stability cannot be achieved
through constitutionalism alone because of presidential elections and the threat of possible civil
war. Because of his fear of political instability and the division of the country, he proposed that
the Republic should be transformed into a constitutional monarchy, and the head of the country
should be a monarch instead of a president: “In order to avert the possibility of such awful times
[,] place the president in a position which is permanent. It follows that the best thing is to make
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him Emperor.” 54 Yang Du believed that if there was no room for competition over the head of
state, China would be stable and the political ambitions of people would disappear: “When that
bone of contention is removed, the people will settle down to business and feel peace in their
hearts, and devote all their energy and time to the pursuit of their vocations. It is logical to
assume that after the adoption of the monarchy they will concentrate on securing a constitutional
government which they know is the only salvation for their country.”55 Here Yang’s judgment is
based not on evidence but only logical assumptions.
Since many people were concerned that if the president of the Republic was transformed into
a permanent monarchal dictator, the resulting so-called constitutional monarchy might eventually
deteriorate into an autocratic monarchy, Yang Du explains that because the monarch understood
that he derived his position from the change from a Republic, in order to satisfy the people, he
would respect the constitutional form of government. At the same time, for his own personal
safety as well as that of future generations, and for the continuation of his policies during his
reign, the monarch would also strive to establish a constitutional political system. Yang Du
further illustrates this point by noting that Wilhelm I of Germany and Emperor Meiji of Japan
both attempted to form a constitutional government and eventually led their countries to realize
constitutionalism. 56 In this part of his essay, Yang does not present more evidence to support his
arguments. Instead, he only comments that it is his hope that Yuan Shikai, who would soon
move from being the president to a monarch, would follow the great emperors of Germany a nd
Japan and lead the country to constitutionalism. Yang’s speculation can be understood as his
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judgment that, based on Yuan Shikai’s own situation at that time, the restoration would
doubtlessly set China on the road to constitutional monarchy rather than autocratic monarchy.

3.1.2.3 Correcting Past Mistakes and Building a Constitutional Monarchy
Even if one accepted the proposition that constitutional monarchy could save the country, in
fact the efforts to achieve constitutionalism in the late Qing and the early Republic were
unsuccessful. Yang Du further analyzes the reasons for the failure of the two stages of
constitutional exploration in China—first, in the final years of the Qing dynasty, and then in the
early republican period—emphasizing that Yuan’s restoration of the monarchy could correct
previous mistakes and achieve the goal of constitutionalism.
First, Yang Du explains that constitutionalism failed in the late Qing because the imperial
family attempted to deceive the people and to foist a false constitutionalism on them. Yang
points out, “In trying to deceive the people by means of a false constitutional government, the
imperial family was responsible for its own destruction.” 57 He reviews the direction of the
constitutional movement and revolutionary trends in the final years of the Qing dynasty,
concluding that the success or failure of constitutionalism depends entirely on the people and
their attitudes. When Yuan Shikai was later in power and strove for real constitutionalism, th e
groundwork for constitutionalism had already been laid, and at the time few people followed the
revolutionary trend. However, after Yuan was forced to retire in 1909, the constitutionalists lost
their core supporter. And then the imperial family removed or sidelined reformist officials and
attempted to grasp unfettered power, and in the end lost the trust of the Chinese people. All these
factors contributed to a revitalization of the revolutionary movement. Yang also uses the words
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of Yuan Shikai to explain this point: “Once ... Yuan Shikai stated in a memorial to the throne
that there were only two alternatives: to give the people a constitutional government or to have
them revolt.” 58 Yang Du concludes that the failure of constitutionalism in the late Qing period
was rooted in the fact that false constitutionalism resulted in a real revolution.
Second, Yang found that although constitutionalism had been put into practice in the
preceding four years of the Republic—with the adoption of the Provisional Constitution, the
formation of a cabinet and the National Assembly—most people believed the constitutional
system in the Republic to be even worse than the system in the late Qing. Yang explains that this
sentiment took hold because the constitutional government was destroyed by the revolutionaries,
who, only by means of the constitutional system could achieve the purpose of revolution. He
uses the Provisional Constitution as an example: “The Provisional Constitution made in Nanjing
[in January 1912] was not so bad, but after the government was removed to Beijing [in March
1912], the Guomindang people tied the hands and feet of the government by means of the
cabinet system and other restrictions with the intention of weakening the power of the central
administration in order that they might be able to start another revolution.”59 From Yang’s
perspective, the constitutional system in the early Republic failed because republicanism led to
disputes over the presidency. Yang concludes that the so-called constitutionalism of the
revolutionaries was another form of false constitutionalism, wielded as a means of fomenting
revolution.
As for how to realize a genuine constitutional system after establishing a constitutional
monarchy, Yang Du puts forward two main points to correct what he considered to be the
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mistakes in the past two stages of constitutional experiments. First, he argues that “the difference
lies in proper procedures and in honesty of purpose, which are imperative if constitutional
government expects to be successful.”60 In Yang’s view, following “proper procedures” would
remedy the disadvantages of the republican period, and, similarly, ensuring “honesty of purpose”
would make sure that the disadvantages of the late Qing period would not be repeated. 61 First
Yang Du emphasizes the importance of adopting an appropriate constitution and following
proper procedures in its implementation. He argues that the Provisional Constitution reflected the
problematic intentions of the revolutionaries in the early republic, and therefore should be
replaced by a constitution modeled on those of constitutional monarchies, such as Germany and
Japan. Doing so would mean adopting an authentic constitution suitable for China’s current
situation. At the same time, the most important aspect of a constitutional system, Yang notes, is
adhering to the constitution to the letter, an imperative stemming from the principle of the
“honesty.” Faithfully and honestly following the constitution would avoid the mistake of
deceiving the people such as happened in the late Qing period. 62 In short, in Yang’s opinion,
with proper procedures and honesty of purpose, a constitutional monarchy would correct the
errors of the late Qing and early republican period. And hence China could achieve the final
objective of building a constitutional system and making the country wealthy and strong.
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3.1.3 Yang’s Persistence: Establishing Constitutionalism through Political Centralism
Throughout Yang Du’s life, he steadfastly insisted on what he believed to be the right path
for China. In the late Qing, he was the initiator and designer of the Qing’s plan for
constitutionalism. In the early republic, he was the chief force behind the establishment of a
constitutional monarchy. After the May Fourth Movement in 1919,63 he came to believe that
socialism was the only viable path for China, and as noted above, he became a secret member of
the CCP. His beliefs, including his call for constitutional government in the late Qing and the
restoration of the monarchy in the early Republic, and finally his embrace of socialism in 1920s,
all deviated from the dominant ideology in Chinese society at the time and had no hope of being
realized. Yet, judging by his writings and what we know of his activities, Yang Du was
unwavering in his beliefs and convinced that eventually they would be vindicated.
At the heart of Yang Du’s thesis is the notion of constitutional government as a centralized
government. In Yang Du’s view, only political centralism, regardless of whether it was a
monarchical system or a socialist system, could ensure that China would sustain its unity and
independence and eventually achieve constitutionalism. With a constitutional government, China
would move up to the historical stage of long-term stability and prosperity. Yang’s exposition
was comprehensive and stirring, and it resonated strongly with Yuan Shikai and many other
social elites at the time.
However, Yang Du’s discussion in his celebrated treatise was more of an expression of his
expectation that a great emperor would emerge who could lead China toward constitutionalism,
rather than a presentation of evidence to support his arguments. His main point was that if a
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constitutional monarchy could be realized, this would lead to a constitutional system, which in
turn would make China prosperous and strong. In fact, he did not seriously address the question
of whether there was a realistic prospect that the republic would be eliminated in favor of a
monarchy, nor, if such a thing came to pass, how China might deal with the many challenges that
would surely follow. Indeed, as we will see in the following section, Liang Qichao demonstrated
in an essay published in 1915 that Yang’s treatise could not withstand rigorous questioning.

3.2

Liang Qichao: Political Centralism through a Presidential Republic

3.2.1

The Chief Force Behind the Opposition to Restoration of Monarchy

Liang Qichao (1893–1929), a celebrated thinker, statesman, educator, historian, and writer—
indeed, one of the most famous intellectual lights in China in the twentieth century—passed the
xiucai (county civil service examination) at the age of eleven and then passed the juren
(provincial examination) at the age of sixteen. In 1895, Liang went to the capital, Beijing, with
Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and became a leader of the One Hundred Day Reform in 1898. When
a conservative coup ended all reforms, Liang fled to Japan where he stayed for the next fourteen
years.64 After the 1911 Revolution Liang joined the Yuan Shikai government as the chief justice,
and then, after the Yuan’s death, he served in the cabinet of the government headed by Duan
Qirui (1865–1936), a protégé of Yuan’s.
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When Yang Du founded the Peace Planning Society and publicly called for the restoration of
the monarchy, Liang Qichao wrote a famous article in rebuttal, “Another View on the So-called
State Structure Question,” 65 published in the journal Greater China (Da Zhonghua) on August
30, 1915, and then reprinted in various newspapers. When Yuan Shikai accepted the “invitation”
to become a monarch in December, Liang immediately decided to start an armed uprising. On
December 22, Liang went to Nanjing to meet with Feng Guozhang (1859–1919), a general and
erstwhile subordinate of Yuan Shikai, to develop a coalition against the restoration. After that
meeting Liang sent a telegram to his pupil Cai E (1882–1916), a warlord in the southern
province of Yunnan, to urge him to launch an armed uprising. On December 25, Cai E declared
the independence of Yunnan and raised the banner of armed opposition to the restoration of the
monarchy. This sparked the National Protection movement, a campaign to undo the restoration,
which culminated in a civil war (the National Protection War, 1915–1916), pitting several
prominent militarists primarily in southern China against Yuan Shikai and his Beiyang clique in
northern China. The Beiyang Army suffered several defeats, putting Yuan under great pressure
and leading him to abdicate on March 22, 1916, thus bringing an end to the restoration. 66 In
short, Liang and his article proved to be the main intellectual force that undid the restoration of
the monarchy.
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3.2.2 “Another View on the So-called State Structure Question”
At the beginning of his famous “Another View” article, Liang Qichao declares that both
political critics and politicians should abide by the principle that, “We should be concerned only
about zhengti [the form of the government] and not about guoti [the form of the state].” 67 To
clarify his meaning, Liang states that “If the administration (government) is constitutional, then it
matters not whether the country is a republic or a monarchy. If the government is not
constitutional, then neither a republic nor a monarchy will avail. … It is an absurd idea to say
that in order to improve the administration (zhengti) we must change the guoti —the status or
form of the country.”68 If one looks at Liang’s article through the lens of political theory, it
becomes clear that his key concern is whether, in practice, the institutions of the state operate in
a way that is despotic or in a way that is constitutional.
In Liang’s perspective, to change the guoti or “national entity”—i.e., the national political
system, such as a republic or a monarchy—was virtually beyond what any political power at that
time could accomplish, let alone something that could be determined by political commentators
or politicians. Liang directly appealed to the political critic Yang Du and the politician Yuan
Shikai to recognize their duty and abide by a crucial rule, “to seek for the improvement and
progress of the administration of the existing foundation of government.” 69 In short, the objective
of Liang’s article was to refute Yang Du’s theory of “national salvation through the
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constitutional monarchy” and to persuade Yuan Shikai not to try to change the guoti. In other
words, Liang argued in favor the republic and against restoration of the monarchy.

3.2.2.1 Restoration Would Amount to Another Revolution
Liang Qichao emphasizes that guoti, the national political system, should be rooted in
existing realities, and that changing the national system must have its own logic and be based on
long-term historical developments. “No form of government is ideal. Its reason of existence can
only be judged by what it has achieved.” 70 Liang believes that it was absurd to artificially change
the guoti based on a theoretically anticipated outcome, and that Yang Du and Yuan Shikai were
making such a mistake. He further warns them that they would be repeating the mistake of the
revolutionaries in the late Qing.
Unlike the revolutionaries, who believed that the 1911 Revolution was a major and historic
step forward, both Yang and Liang believed it was a fundamental mistake for the “first transition
of the state system” in the 1911 Revolution to be toward republicanism: “The reason I have
decided not to boldly advocate a change in the form of the state is because for years my heart has
been burdened with an unspeakable sorrow and pain, believing, as I do, that ever since the
mistake made in 1911, hope for China’s future has dwindled to almost nothing.” 71 Based on their
shared belief in constitutionalism and gradual reform, Liang Qichao and Yang Du had more or
less the same understanding of most issues confronting China. Liang fully understood Yang Du’s
reasons for supporting monarchical constitutionalism and opposing republicanism, and for many
years Liang himself also pondered over the necessary conditions for a restoration of the
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monarchy. “On one hand I have been troubled with our inability to make the Republic a success,
and on the other I have been worrying over the fact that it would be impossible to restore the
monarchy.”72 He concluded that only when China had achieved a genuine revival and had
become a hegemonic power under the leadership of a president with outstanding abilities, might
restoration have a chance to succeed.73 However, eventually Liang came to believe that
restoration was impossible at that time: “Ever since the days of monarchical gov ernment the
people have looked on monarch with a sort of divine reverence, and never dared to question or
criticize his position. After a period of republicanism, however, this attitude on the part of
common people has been abruptly terminated with no possibility of resurrection.” 74
In Liang’s view, the revolution would only trigger another revolution and result in an
unstable political situation that could not bring real social progress: “A change in the form of
government is a manifestation of progress while a change in the status of the state is a sign of
revolution. The path of progress leads to further progress, but the path of revolution leads to
more revolution. This is a fact proven by theory as well as actual experience.” 75 Therefore, Liang
believed that the restoration, since it would amount to “changing the state system twice,” was the
same as the preceding revolution. It would be a repetition of the mistakes of the revolution and
would cause the country to perish. “Therefore, a man who has any love for his country, is afraid
to mention revolution; and, as for myself, I have always opposed revolution. I am now opposing
your theory of monarchical revolution, just as I once opposed your theory of republican
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revolution, in the same spirit, and I am carrying out the same duty.” 76 Liang reiterated his
consistent position that he was opposed to overturning the state, no matter whether that involved
the revolution in the late Qing or the restoration in the early Republic. Liang Qichao adhered to
this belief throughout his life, consistently supporting gradual reform and opposing radical
revolution.

3.2.2.2 A Constitutional Monarchy: Who Would Really Govern?
Yang Du stressed that no one could really unify the country and exercise effective, vigorous
leadership except Yuan Shikai: “The answer is that there is not a single man whose qualifications
are high enough to be the successor. … The vital question of the day, setting aside all paper talk,
is whether or not China has a suitable man to succeed President Yuan Shikai.” 77 In Yang’s view,
the republican system was not feasible in China especially because of the problem of the
succession of the head of state. This systemic problem was not limited to republicanism but was
simply a reality that China faced at that time.
Liang had little difference with Yang on this point, but he argued that it was absurd to change
the guoti in the hope that this would solve the problem: “Therefore, the question of whether
China will be left in peace or not depends entirely on the length of the Great President’s life and
what he will be able to accomplish in his lifetime. Whether the country is ruled as a republic or a
monarchy, the consequences will be the same.” 78 He points out that whether the state succumbs
to chaos or not is determined by the nature of the government rather than by the national political
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system: “Soberly speaking, any form of state is capable of either ensuring a successful
government or causing rebellion. And nine cases out of ten the cause of rebellion lies in the
conditions of the administration and not in the form of state.” 79 Thus, from Liang’s perspective,
at that time the security of the country rested solely on the shoulders of Yuan Shikai and was not
related to guoti, the constitutional monarchy, or the republic.
In an attempt to reach a consensus with Yang Du, Liang Qichao first elaborates on the
definition of constitutionalism and the principles of constitutional monarchy: “My opponents
will agree with me that the main principle of a constitutional government is that the legislature
should always balance the executive and that the exercise of administrative power is always
limited to a certain extent. They will also agree that the most important point of a so-called
constitutional monarchy is that the monarch should act as a figurehead, and that the
establishment of a responsible cabinet is an indispensable accompaniment.” 80 After laying the
ground for this argument, he directly points out that the most critical issue in realizing the
monarchy at that time was identifying who should be the monarch. Liang understood that no one
in China at that time had a greater reputation and or more ability to govern than Yuan Shikai, and
thus a restoration would eventually lead to Yuan as the monarch. He further questioned, “Shall
we then make the present president a monarch? ... Do we expect that he will become a mere
figurehead?”81
Liang thus put his finger on the key question involved in restoration: Who would be
ultimately responsible for governing? Liang further points out that because Yuan Shikai played
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an irreplaceable role in managing the internal and external troubles at the time, there was a
fundamental problem with the restoration: if a constitutional monarchy were implemented, Yuan
Shikai would become the nominal monarch instead of the actual head of the government. There
was no other person in China who could take on this responsibility: “My contention is that there
is no one, within my knowledge, who commands respect enough and is capable of taking over of
the responsibility of Yuan.” 82 Therefore, despite agreeing with Yang Du that Yuan Shikai was
irreplaceable, Liang Qichao was firmly opposed to changing the guoti, believing that Yuan
Shikai could lead China to unification and stable development for the next ten years under the
then current republican system.

3.2.2.3 Exploring the Path of Constitutionalism under the Current Republican System

After pointing out that a constitutional monarchy could not save the country, Liang Qichao
tried to persuade the constitutionalists to bravely explore the path of constitutionalism under the
current republican system: “If, on the other hand, the present critics are really in earnest for a
constitution, then I am unable to understand why they believe that this cannot be secured under
the Republic but must be obtained in a roundabout way by means of a monarchy.” 83
Writing in 1913, Liang Qichao further notes that in the preceding two years he led the
Progressive Party in fully supporting Yuan’s election as the formal president, the abolition of the
Provisional Constitution and adoption a new constitution, and the change from a cabinet system
to a presidential system, which, in Liang’s eyes, was the best way to govern the country in
accordance with the actual conditions of China at that time. Liang stressed that the current
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republican system had already remedied the drawbacks of republicanism by adopting the
presidential system and allowing Yuan Shikai to become a lifelong president. He was convinced
that the new constitution met China’s current needs and was sufficient to settle most political
disputes.84 As long as solid and persistent efforts were made, constitutionalism would eventually
emerge under the current republican system.

3.2.3 The Yang-Liang Disagreement: Constitutional Monarchy or Presidential Republic?
Yang Du simply attributed the loss of centralized authority after the 1911 Revolution to the
republican system, especially its competition for the presidency, which he believed would
inevitably lead to chaos. In Yang’s view, only by replacing the president with a monarch could
this chaos be ended.85 Yang also believed that if China adopted a Western-style democratic
republican system—a political model entailing party competition, voting in parliament, and
presidential elections—the result would inevitably be clashes between the various political
parties and warfare among China’s regional warlords, leading to the break-up of the country. To
reiterate, in his view the only acceptable path for China was a constitutional monarchy, a model
embraced by other ascendant countries such as Japan and Germany.86 Yang Du believed
constitutional monarchy was an ideal solution based on China’s realities. Furthermore, he hoped
to avoid the national trauma of incessant struggle for power among China’s militarists. To a

Liang Qichao, “Another View on the So-called State Structure Question,” 167; Liang Qichao, “Yi zhe
suo wei guoti wenti zhe,” 152.
85 Yang Du, “A Defence of the Monarchical Movement,” 127; Yang Du, “Junxian jiu guo lun,” 115.
86 Yang Du, “A Defence of the Monarchical Movement,” 128; Yang Du, “Junxian jiu guo lun,” 115–116.
84

35
certain extent, the later history of China—with its dark era of warlordism—confirmed his farsightedness. 87
In contrast to Yang Du, Liang Qichao accepted the established presidential republican
system as a political reality, a view shared by most Chinese elites, and it could support Yuan
Shikai’s social and economic development strategy at that time. He also recognized that the
nation’s conditions were such that restoration of the monarchy, or even instituting a
constitutional monarchy, something that most elites had long favored, could not but fail. Trying
to change the guoti, thus, would make it impossible to achieve the goal of establishing a
prosperous nation, and would also lead to other disastrous consequences for China. 88
Based on their shared belief in constitutionalism and gradual reform, Liang Qichao and
Yang Du had the same understanding of most issues facing China. However, while Yang insisted
on constitutional monarchy for the rest of his life, Liang Qichao’s thinking evolved, moving
from advocacy of constitutional monarchy in the late Qing to defense of republicanism in the
early republic. Nonetheless, in Liang’s perspective his position remained unchanged for his
whole life: he consistently supported gradual reform and opposed radical revolution. 89 Here,
Liang Qichao touched on a key issue of modern Chinese history—whether China’s
modernization required gradual reform or radical revolution. Yuan Shikai and the Beiyang
clique, as well as Yang Du and Liang Qichao, were all constitutionalists who believed in gradual
reform towards constitutional republic via a constitutional monarchy first. In contrast, Sun Yat-
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sen and the Guomindang believed in radical revolution to create a new republic right away.
These two paths, which were very clearly encapsulated in the famous Yang-Sun debate in Japan
in 1903 mentioned above, were discussed at length in China’s newspapers. But by 1919 China
arrived at a historic turning point: with Yuan Shikai gone from the scene and his Beiyang clique
in decline, “revolution” in China became a positive expression which represented the progress of
society. Only after 1979, with the adoption of the Reform and Opening Up movement, which set
“reform” into motion, did nearly sixty years of “revolution” come to an end .90 This seemed to
mark a return to what Yuan, Yang, and Liang consistently believed, namely that only with
continuing, long-term reform could China make real progress.
The difference between Yang and Liang, to reiterate, turned on the question of restoration.
Yang argued that restoration was necessary for China to return to the path of the late Qing
reforms, while Liang countered that restoration was equivalent to revolution, and thus would
further draw China away from the track of gradual reform. The better choice in Liang’s view was
to pursue social and economic developing under the current presidential republican system.
Compared to Yang Du’s idealistic solution, Liang Qichao’s thinking was based on the political
reality that the republican system had been implemented after the fall of the Qing empire, and
that the foundation of constitutional monarchy had already disappeared. The two opposing views
were clearly and forcefully expressed to Yuan Shikai and the Chinese people through their two
famous papers discussed here.

On the Reform and Opening Up movement, see Jacques Delisle and Avery Goldstein, To Get Rich Is
Glorious: Challenges Facing China’s Economic Reform and Opening at Forty (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2019), 1–26, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/9780815737254_ch1.pdf. Also see Klaus Mülhaln, Making China Modern:
From the Great Qing to Xi Jinping (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 491–526,
https://chinachannel.org/2019/02/07/reform-opening/.
90

37
3.3

Frank Goodnow: Political Centralism and Constitutionalism

3.3.1 Frank Goodnow and His Memorandum “Monarchy or Republic?”
Yuan’s strategy of political centralism and constitutional monarchy was influenced not only
by his domestic advisors Yang Du and Liang Qichao, but also by his foreign advisors, especially
the American political scientist and educator Frank Goodnow (1859–1939).91 Goodnow was best
known to the Chinese for a memorandum, “Monarchy or Republic?,” which he composed in the
summer of 1915. 92 In this essay Goodnow criticizes the suddenness of China’s transformation
into a liberal republican regime and asserts that any feasible political system must be compatible
with reality on the ground and the people’s wishes. He further points out that under the current
internal and external conditions, China should choose a new form of government to ensure its
survival. Given conditions at the time, constitutional monarchy, he asserts, would be more
appropriate for China than a democratic republic. Since Goodnow was a well-known Western
expert on constitutionalism and a citizen of United States, the most successful republican
country, Chinese tended to consider his argument fair and objective. The Chinese people in
general found it convincing and it had a great impact across the country.
Goodnow’s insights quickly became the main theoretical support for the initiatives of the
Peace Planning Society. Yang Du drafted the declaration of the establishment of the society,
turning Goodnow’s conditional proposal into an authoritative and unconditional conclusion:
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“The United States of America is the oldest republic in the world. Yet its great expert in political
theory, Dr. Goodnow, has declared that, as a political system, monarchism is actually better than
republicanism, and that China should choose monarchism.”93 Yang Du, a Chinese constitutional
theorist, found an echo of his ideas from a Western constitutional authority, Goodnow. This
further convinced him of the correctness of his own thinking and encouraged him to move from
theorizing to practice. Yang also used Goodnow as an example to encourage Chinese elites to
take responsibility for their own country: “Foreigners who wish us well loudly warn us [against
drifting along as we have been doing], yet we ourselves give in to what is called fate instead of
seeking a fundamental solution. … We are citizens of China. The survival of our country is our
own survival. How can we sit back, waiting for and watching her destruction? So, we gather
together to form this society in order to plan for peace in our land.”94 With the support of the
theories of both Yang Du and Goodnow, the movement for the establishment of a constitutional
monarchy thus formally stepped onto the stage of Chinese history.
However, when we carefully study the original terms and their meanings in Goodnow’s
memorandum, we will find that Goodnow and Yang Du had different positions on the
restoration. The memorandum has no sentence that clearly states, for example, “monarchism is
actually better than republicanism, and that China should choose monarchism.” On the con trary,
Goodnow’s advice seemed a little hesitant and reticent: “What ... should be the attitude of those
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who have the welfare of China at heart? Should they advocate the continuance of the republic, or
should they propose the establishment of a monarchy? These are difficult questions to answer.”95
Indeed, his circumspect answer to this question could be interpreted as either encouragement or
warning: “It is of course not susceptible of doubt that a monarchy is better suited than a republic
to China. China’s history and traditions, her social and economic conditions, her relations with
foreign powers all make it probable that the country would develop that constitutional
government which it must develop if it is to preserve its independence as a State, more e asily as
a monarchy than as a republic.” 96 Perhaps out of fear of being misunderstood, Goodnow stresses
that a change from a republic to a monarchy could only be successful under three conditions:
1st.
That the change does not meet with such opposition either on the part of the Chinese
people or of foreign Powers as will lead to the recurrence of the disorders which the
present republican government has successfully put down. ...
2d.
The change from republic to monarchy would be of little avail if the law of succession is
not so fixed that there will be no doubt as to the successor. The succession should not be
left to the crown to determine. ... It is probably of course true that the authority of an
emperor would be more respected than the authority of a president. The people have been
accustomed to an emperor. They hardly know what a president is. At the same time, it
would seem doubtful if the increase of authority resulting from the change from president
to emperor would be sufficient to justify the change, if the question of the succession
were not so securely fixed as to permit of no doubt. For this is the one greatest advantage
of the monarchy over the republic.
3rd.
In the third place it is very doubtful whether the change from republic to monarchy would
be of any lasting benefit to China if provision is not made for the development under the
monarchy of the form of constitutional government. ... [China’s] people will never
develop the necessary patriotism unless they are given greater participation in the
government than they have had in the past. The government never will acquire the
necessary strength unless it has the cordial support of the people.97
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Although Goodnow’s own words suggest he envisioned the same objective as Yang Du (i.e.,
that constitutional government must be adopted for national salvation), the path Goodnow
marked out to realize this objective--“the country would develop that constitutional government
… more easily as a monarchy than as a republic”—was not as unalterable and unconditional as
Yang’s “China should choose the monarchism.” Following Goodnow’s line of thought, if China
had already adopted a constitutional monarchy, then it would be easier to implement
constitutional government than if it had a republican system. As for whether it was the right time
to change the national system from a republic to a monarchy, as noted above he merely argued
that three conditions had to be met. Regarding Yang Du’s belief that the current republican
system must be rejected and the monarchy must be restored, or Liang Qichao’s understanding
that changing the existing national system itself would not only fail to achieve constitutional
monarchy but also lead the country to catastrophe, Goodnow did not take a clear position.
Rather, he left it to the Chinese elites to exercise their judgment and make their choice.
In their studies of the history of Yuan Shikai’s restoration of the monarchy, most later
scholars mention the influence of Goodnow’s memorandum, but they have a wide range of
evaluations of Goodnow. Jerome Ch’en believes that Goodnow’s advice was absurd and violated
common sense: “Why such an eminent scholar should have come forward to speak so naively for
Yuan Shikai on this difficult question still remains a mystery.” 98 Patrick Shan, on the other hand,
is sympatric to Goodnow but recognizes the negative impact of his words: “It is wrong to claim,
as the traditional view does, that Goodnow was part of an enthusiastic vanguard for Yuan’s
monarchism, yet nobody should deny that his article played a unique role in promoting Yuan’s
monarchical movement.” 99 Ernest Young suggests that Goodnow was the most prominent
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foreign advocate of Yuan’s restoration project and cannot be absolved of responsibility even
though the advice in his memorandum was conditional: “It is true that he soon regretted his
temerity and began to emphasize the conditions (foreign and domestic toleration, arrangements
for the succession, and plans for a constitution) that he had attached to his monarchical
prescription. On the other hand, he believed that the conditions would be ready met.” 100 Unlike
most Chinese historians, who have only considered Goodnow’s negative impact on Chinese
society during Yuan’s restoration, 101 Young has a more balanced reading of his work: “There
was more behind Goodnow’s analysis than an adjustment of theory to his perception of Chinese
realities, or a desire to justify Yuan’s policies. One wonders whether he believed in his own scale
for measuring the progress of societies. A general mistrust of democracy and liberalism is
detectable.” 102 Young also finds that Goodnow’s thinking was careful and consistent over time:
“Generally, his monarchical advocacy was quite consistent with the approach toward Chinese
problems that he had taken in supporting the dictatorship in 1913 and 1914.”103 In hindsight, one
could say that Ernest Young’s observation is more accurate and valuable than the viewpoints of
other scholars.

3.3.2 Goodnow’s Understanding and Contribution to China’s Constitutionalism
In fact, as an advisor, Goodnow played an important role in Yuan’s political centralism
project beginning shortly after Goodnow arrived in Beijing in 1913. When the National
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Assembly proposed a draft constitution that clearly tilted the balance of power be tween the
legislative and executive branches in favor of the former, Yuan immediately banned the
Guomindang from the assembly. Goodnow completely supported Yuan’s position. 104 Even
before this, Goodnow wrote an article criticizing the draft constitution proposed by the
Guomindang. And after this ban, he published another article on the importance of securing the
primacy of the president in the drafting of the constitution. Even though he had not given up his
belief in some kind of representative government, he clearly stated that China’s representative
government should have a highly restrictive form. He also urged Yuan Shikai not to dissolve the
National Assembly completely, but when he learned that the dissolution was unavoidable, he
proposed an amendment suggesting that the new assembly could be composed in part by
presidential appointees and in part by representatives elected from various social classes, such as
intellectuals, merchants, and landlords. 105
In May 1914, Yuan’s government issued a so-called Constitutional Compact. 106 Although
Goodnow did not publicly claim he was the designer and the person actually responsible for this
document, no one can deny that his imprint is visible throughout it. 107 In a report to the Carnegie
Endowment, Goodnow commented on the Constitutional Compact: “Most of the ideas I
recommended in the draft I made a year ago have been adopted, although they have given the
president somewhat greater independence of the legislature than I had proposed. I must confess,
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however, that on the whole I approved what has been done.”108 We can also find a clue to
Goodnow’s influence in the fact that, in the following weeks, he often met with the Yuan Shikai
and his staff to discuss the next step in implementing this document. 109 In theory, the
Constitutional Compact was an amendment to the Provisional Constitution, a counter to the
Temple of Heaven Constitution proposed by the Guomindang as a permanent constitution to
replace the Provisional Constitution, and a ratification of Yuan’s policy of centralized authority.
Goodnow’s views over time were remarkably consistent. The new constitution that
Goodnow drafted for China was definitely not based on catering to politics in China or defending
the policies of Yuan’s government but derived from Goodnow’s own unique understanding of
constitutional politics. His theoretical basis was functionalism. As Young suggests, “By his
approach to politics Goodnow was led continually to refashion his position. He believed that
institutions, in their multifunctional complexities, must accord with the realities if they were to
prosper. … His functionalism became, in practice, an instrument for justifying a flight from
liberalism.” 110 Indeed, his approach was a denial of democratic republicanism based on
individualism and liberalism. At the annual meeting of the American Political Association in
Chicago, in December 1914, in an address entitled “Reform in China,” he further asserted that,
Representative government, certainly in forms in which we find it in the modern
European states, may well be impossible for adoption in China until such time as
greater capacity for social cooperation has developed. ... A form of government
which has many of the earmarks of absolutism must continue until she [China]
develops greater submission to political authority, great powers of social
cooperation and great regard of private rights. 111
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Goodnow’s insights and contributions to China’s constitutionalism were significant not only for
the early Republic, but also for the later history of modern China. Unlike the 1912 Provisional
Constitution, which was hastily drafted by Song Jiaoren during the Revolution of 1911 and
hurriedly proposed with the clear objective of restricting the power of the president, the
constitution drafted by Goodnow was based on his observations of politics in China for a period
combined with his own understanding of the requirements for a constitution that could be
successful in China. In his view, in its history and realities a huge Asian country like China was
fundamentally different from Western countries, and hence instead of offering a standard
prescription calling for freedom and democracy, Goodnow proposed a plan he designed
especially for China that might create a theoretical framework for balancing political centralism
and constitutionalism. Goodnow thus laid out a realistic path for China to implement
constitutionalism while respecting the country’s tradition of political centralism. Unfortunately,
there was not enough time to test the feasibility of Goodnow’s design during Yuan’s presidency.
However, in the later history of modern China, especially in the institutions of the Political
Consultative Conference and the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China,
Goodnow influence can be detected. Therefore, when discussing the origins of the current
Chinese political system, it is necessary to re-examine Goodnow’s proposal and the discussions
between Goodnow and the Yuan Shikai government. In hindsight, the later history of modern
China has proved the value of Goodnow’s insights. Since the 1890s, various Western models
have been tried in China. It was obvious that no Western model could completely solve the
problems faced by this huge Asian country. While absorbing various fo reign experiences, China
had to explore and find in its own way. After repeated reforms and revolutions, and constant
experiments and corrections, China would eventually develop a unique model, a new republican
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system that could lead to constitutional political centralism.112

Yuan’s Three Advisors: Their Common Objective and Disagreements
It should be noted that Yuan’s strategy of political centralism was based a realistic view of
the political conditions and the various problems arising from China’s experiments with a liberal
republican system in 1912–1913. Although they started from different standpoints, they all reach
the same conclusion: national salvation could only be secured through political centralism and
constitutionalism. They all disapproved of the liberalism and provincialism of the early Republic
and espoused a strong, constitutional central government. And they all agreed that China’s
liberal assemblies should be abolished and replaced with new representative institutions. Finally,
they each promoted a common understanding that the Chinese government should be politically
centralized and constitutional.
They disagreed, however, on how to achieve these objectives. In Yang Du’s view, national
salvation could only be secured through constitutional monarchy; Liang Qichao believed that
promoting political centralism through the current presidential republican system was the only
feasible path for China; and Frank Goodnow focused on drafting a realistic constitution and
evaluating the respective preconditions for and advantages and disadvantages of monarchism and
republicanism. Nevertheless, whatever their agreements and disagreements were, they only
emerged from an intellectual background in 1915 and would be tested by the decisions and
actions of Yuan Shikai.

As John Fairbank concluded in the preface to his last monograph, China, A New History, “Once the
modern revolution in Chinese thought got under way in the 1890s, it became evident that no foreign
model could fit Chinese situation, that many models would be used but none would be adequate, and that
the creative Chinese people would have to work out their salvation in their own way. Having had a unique
past, they would have their own unique future” (p. xix).
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4

YUAN’S QUEST: FROM POLITICAL CENTRALISM TO CONSTITUTIONAL
MONARCHY

Even though Yuan Shikai was influenced by his advisors, the decision to restore the
monarchy was made by Yuan himself. As the leader of the constitutional reform movement and
the most eminent statesman in the late Qing period, Yuan was very clear about China’s realities,
its internal problems, and external challenges. As early as November 1911, Yuan pointed out that
there were two fundamental questions facing China at that time: first, whether the government
should be a monarchy or a republic; and second, whether the state should be organized as a
federal system or a centralized system.113 The results of the 1911 Revolution seemed such that a
republic might be a compromise on which all parties could agree. Their experience with the
experiment in the early Republic led Yuan and his advisors, as discussed in this chapter, to
develop their respective judgments on the first issue. As for the second question—political
centralism or its opposite, provincialism—it had been discussed, debated, and struggled over for
a long time in the early Republic.
Since the founding of the first dynasty of imperial China in 221 BCE, the country has had a
long tradition of political centralism, with politically unified times seen as normal and
administratively centralized regimes as legitimate. In contrast, medieval feudalism, such as that
in Europe and Japan, was regarded as abnormal and chaotic. Although the 1911 Revolution
ended China’s centralized monarchical system, the idea of centralism lived on. So it is that this
idea, based on a very long history of a strong central government and the Confucian civil official
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system, made good sense for the Chinese. Throughout Chinese history this tradition brought
unity and stability to the country. To understand why Yuan rushed his attempt to restore the
monarchy, we need to start our examination with this issue, political centralism. Yuan’s quest for
political centralism both at the center and in the provinces emerged in the context of his
restoration of the monarchy in 1915. It was the search for these two types of centralism that
formed the rationale behind Yuan’s political strategy and his decision to establish a
constitutional monarchy.
In the early republic, Yuan Shikai face two main struggles. The first was the struggle for
state power with the Guomindang, the majority party in the National Assembly; and the second
was the struggle between the central government and the provinces, most of which enjoyed de
facto autonomy.114 Once appointed president, Yuan Shikai started to put into action his belief in
centralized authority both at the center and in the provinces. At the center, in November 1913 he
banned the Guomindang and dissolved the National Assembly. And to bring the provinces under
the control of the central government, Yuan’s first step was to dispatch units of the Beiyang
Army to occupy most provinces. He then ordered the suspension of all provincial assemblies as
well as local autonomous organs, which were created as part of the Xinzheng reforms in the first
decade of the twentieth century and strongly promoted by Yuan himself as well as by Liang
Qichao and other reformers. 115 As a consequence, the power of official appointments in the
province reverted to the central government.
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4.1

Political Centralism at the National Level: Creating a New Representative System

4.1.1 Dissolving the National Assembly and Establishing the Political Conference
After a year of experience with the early Republic, Yuan Shikai came to believe that China’s
liberal republican representative system was a barrier to administrative efficiency and economic
development.116 Around that time, many other people, including Liang Qichao and Cai E, also
felt that the president should be given more power and the representative assembly system
should be abolished. 117 Nevertheless, Yuan’s dissolution of the National Assembly was the result
of the gradual unfolding of his power struggle with the Guomindang. Initially, Yuan needed the
National Assembly since he wanted it to elect him as the official president and to formulate a
constitution that supported the presidential system. With the support of the Progressive Party
headed by Liang Qichao, on October 6, 1913, Yuan was indeed made the official president. He
hoped that the National Assembly would go further and replace the Provisional Constitution and
with a new constitution. But, as we have noted, his hope was not fulfilled. In the years 1912–
1913, the Guomindang was the majority party in the National Assembly, and it too favored a
new constitution, but one that would further restrict the power of the president. Despite Yuan’s
opposition, the Guomindang-controlled National Assembly sought to pass the so-called Temple
of Heaven Constitution. As Yuan saw it, this was an attempt “to impose by committees and votes
what Guomindang revolutionaries had failed to achieve with arms.” 118 At this point, Yuan Shikai
had no room to retreat, and he expelled the Guomindang members on November 4 and
suspended National Assembly.
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A pragmatic politician, Yuan Shikai had gradually developed the idea that the National
Assembly should be replaced with a new representative institution, the Political Conference. His
thinking was likely influenced by Goodnow’s observations and advice—beginning soon after
Goodnow arrived in China in 1913—on the feasibility of constitutionalism in China. In a 1914
article published in the American Political Science Review, Goodnow concluded that “for quite a
time to come the function of a Chinese representative body should in large measure be
consultative and advisory.” 119 In late 1913, Yuan advanced the idea of creating the Political
Conference as a new legislature to replace the National Assembly. He expressed his hope that
“the council could guide the people into the right orbit of republicanism and reach the goal of
national salvation.” 120 The Political Conference was formally established on November 26, 1913.
Its representatives, “appointed by the provincial governments, by the president, the prime
minister, and the various departments of the central government,” were responsible for
discussing the country’s development and reform policies and tasks.121
Yuan’s strategy of creating a new representative institution was supported by many
influential social elites. A few months after the Political Conference was convened, Liang
Qichao pointed out, “Although we highly value the National Assembly, our esteem for it cannot
compare to our regard for the nation.” 122 As a leading member of the cabinet and the leader of
the Progressive Party, Liang generally supported Yuan. Although Liang did not agree with the
dissolution of the National Assembly at that time, he nonetheless hoped that the new Political
Conference might better fit China’s situation and promote the country’s development and its
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quest for wealth and power. Liang declared that if the National Assembly could not lead the
country to peace and prosperity, then it ought to be dissolved. 123 Leveling specific charges
against the National Assembly—that it was overwhelmed by party struggle based on private
interests, that it obstructed administrative efficiency, and that it had produced no significant
legislation—on January 9, 1914, the Political Conference recommended that all remaining
members of the National Assembly be evicted, which Yuan accepted and then dissolved the
National Assembly. 124

4.1.2 Dissolving the Provincial Assemblies and Reconstructing a New Centralized System
Yuan’s order that provincial assemblies and local autonomous organs be suspended was
based on two rationales. First, local self -government agencies had taken over the powers that
rightfully belonged to higher-level governments, thus hindering administration, and reducing
revenue. Second, many local autonomous institutions angered the ordinary people, which incited
dissatisfaction and rebellion. 125 Yuan’s response was to overthrow the entire structure of elective
councils and assemblies that had grown up with his indispensable contribution since the late
Qing period. Even though he promised that he would construct a new republican system, by the
time of his death, Yuan had still not convened an effective national parliament, nor had he
reinvigorated local autonomy. What people saw was that he established a centralized government
in which he was all-powerful. Therefore, Yuan’s political centralism policy directly hurt the
interests of the gentry class. As Young points out, “By abolishing the whole panoply of local
assemblies and councils, however, Peking was touching the sensitive nerves of local elite
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interest.” 126 Throughout the late imperial period and into the Republic, the gentry were a very
consequential force, enjoying prestige and social authority in their local commu nities and
beyond.127 It is little wonder that later scholars have usually criticized Yuan’s project as a
dictatorship based on his own private ambitions.128
In order to reconstruct a centralized administrative system, Yuan also abolished many
republican organs and created new ones. As before, there would be a legislature and a state
council, but now the members of both would be appointed by Yuan and serve at his pleasure . As
Patrick Shan points out, “There would be a legislature (Lifayuan), but its members would be
appointed by Yuan, who could also dissolve it. There would be a Political Participation Council
(Canzhengyuan), but its members would be appointed by him .”129 Yuan also established two new
organs, a Political Supervision Board and a Political Correction Board, both intended to ensure
corruption-free and efficient administration by supervising and disciplining officials. 130 To
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eliminate checks on his authority as president, Yuan erected a state framework in which all the
levers of power were in his hands. He blurred the lines between the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches, and put them all under his control. He also abolished the cabinet and
established in its place a Board of Political Affairs, headed by the secretary of state, charged with
carrying out Yuan’s policies and overseeing administration. 131

Political Centralism and the Provinces: Yuan’s Response to Provincialism

4.2

4.2.1

The Ideology of Provincialism and Yuan’s Position on Provincialism

The liberal Republic of China in 1912–1913 was a federal, not a centralized, system,
meaning that most provinces were under the control of provincial governors and provincial
assemblies. The central government had virtually no power over such provinces. 132 Yuan Shikai
and centralists realized that the biggest challenge facing the central government came from the
ideology of provincialism, which suggested that provincial autonomy was an important part of
China’s national strength. According to this view, the provinces could undertake nationa l
responsibilities within their own borders. The provincial self-governments, to continue this line
of reasoning, would do better than the central government and, exercising their autonomy, would
ultimately make a greater contribution to national strength. Linked with revolutionary
enthusiasm, provincial autonomy had become a powerful support for provincial military leaders
to consolidate their local authority and for the gentry class to gain power through elite -controlled
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self-government organizations. In 1912, radical newspapers in Shanghai expressed a common
view: “The province, taken by itself, is a self -sufficient state. It is natural that the management of
its affairs should best be left entirely to its people. Hence, we advocate popular election of its
chief executive.” 133 If this trend of provincialism was allowed to continue, the consequences for
national unity would become increasingly serious.
The emergence of provincialism was an expression of nationalism and a product of its time.
In the early twentieth century, as China was facing the fate of being partitioned by foreign
powers, the nationalistic enthusiasm of the gentry class was unprecedentedly high. Since the
central government in Beijing repeatedly failed to stem foreign encroachment and invasion, most
gentry who were not officials but were educated in Confucian ethics believed they had the
responsibility of shouldering the task of national salvation.134 They hoped to protect their own
provinces and thereby defend the sovereignty of China. Beginning in the late Qing dynasty, the
gentry began to organize within their own provinces to promote local reforms and various
political movements. They expressed their patriotic enthusiasm and political views using their
own provinces as their platform. This produced a phenomenon of “provincialism” unlike
anything seen previously. 135
At the same time, with the influx of modern Western ideas, provincialism had also found
new support in the concepts of autonomous government and federalism. As early as 1897–1898,
Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao had provided the theoretical basis for provincial autonomy. In
1901, Liang Qichao borrowed from Rousseau’s advocacy of federalism in small countries to
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propose that China could tap into its own popular tradition of autonomy to build autonomous
counties and provinces, and further proposed that the fundamental starting point of provincial
autonomy should be not only the cultivation of democracy and individual freedom as specified in
Western philosophy, but also the reform of the entire national system to release the maximum
energy of the Chinese people. And this energy for development, Liang believed, could lead
China to achieve the fundamental goal of national independence and prosperity.136 As a
provincial journal noted in 1903, “The spirit of self-government lies in taking the nation’s affairs
as purposes of the locality’s existence and in using the strength of the locality to effect [this
purpose].” 137
In fact, it was the Xinzheng reforms in the late Qing that set-in motion the growth and
organization of provincial sentiment. As a high-ranking official and a main promoter of
constitutional reform of in the late Qing, Yuan Shikai had gained a reputation as “the father of
China’s constitutional reform.” 138 Like most reformers, who were drawn to Western
constitutionalism, in a 1907 memorial to the throne, Yuan argued that constitutional rule would
help consolidate imperial power, attract talented people to serve the country, forestall v iolent
revolution, promote social harmony, and win the support of the gentry class. Yuan especially
played a key role in the promotion and implementation of these reforms both in the center and in
the hinterlands. In the center, in line with a proposal Yuan made in 1905, the Qing court, as
noted earlier, sent five ministers to study the modern constitutions of Japan and the West and
then officially promulgated an edict calling for steps toward constitutionalism and a
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constitutional monarchy as state policy. 139 In the provinces, it was Yuan who pushed forward
provincial constitutional reforms step by step, which provided the impetus for provincialism.
As the governor-general of the province of Zhili, in northern China, Yuan Shikai
concentrated on promoting the autonomy of the city of Tianjin, the provincial capital. Yuan first
“dispatched local elites to Japan to study regional autonomy,” and then “established a local
autonomy research institute and built a local autonomy bureau” to prepare for the popular
election in 1907 of the Tianjin Assembly, the first provincial assembly in China.140 Yuan paid a
great deal of attention to this election, including voter qualifications: at a minimum, voters had to
be twenty-five years old, possess property valued at two thousand taels of silver (a very large
sum of money), 141 have a clean criminal record, have an elementary school education, and so on.
Out of a total population of 418,215, two hundred thousand voters were registered, but only
12,461 men were qualified as voters, and 2,572 were legible to sit in the assembly. 142 In July
1907, thirty men were elected to the assembly. Since the Tianjin Assembly was China’s first
local assembly and it continued almost until the 1920s, this election and the local autonomy
connected with it would have a long-term impact in modern Chinese history. After the election,
Yuan congratulated those who had been elected and proclaimed that “the election process was a
model for Zhili as a province and for China as a nation.” This newly created local autonomous
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institution represented a structural break with the traditional Chinese system. It was the first time
in Chinese history that local gentry had been allowed to participate in formal governance. 143

4.2.2 Centralism and Provincialism: A Tug of War
In the first two years of the Republic (1912–1913), even though some important political
leaders, including Yuan Shikai and Cai E, believe that centralizing administrative authority was
essential for unifying China, their voice was overwhelmed by the supporters of local selfgovernment in most provinces and was rejected by the National Assembly. In fact, in its first
year the Republic was a federal system, or a liberal republican system with provincialism. Since
the last few years of the Qing dynasty, many more elites had come to believe that a federal
system was more conducive to China’s overall development than a centralized system. After the
1911 Revolution, the gentry class had made two demands: that the country should be united and
that the provinces should enjoy autonomy. 144 Most provinces had already become fully
autonomous—they commanded their own provincial armies, retained tax revenue (including the
land tax which had been the central government’s largest source of revenue),145 and selecting
local and provincial officials. At the same time, local councils below the provincial level had
further expanded and had become more and more arbitrary. Provincial autonomy, which imitated
federalism as it was found in the United States and envisioned a similar political system, became
the mainstream opinion at that time. Provincialists believed that the two principles of unity and
autonomy could be combined in a federal system. 146
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As the president of China, Yuan Shikai paid special attention to two aspects of the basic
administrative functions of the central government—the appointment of officials and state
finance. In mid-1912, Yuan faced a dilemma: the National Assembly thwarted his government.
Even in the provinces he controlled—Zhili, Henan, and Shandong—his power of appointment
was uncertain. His old followers, such as Tang Shaoyi (1862–1938), who had been Yuan’s chief
assistant late in the nineteenth century, were joining other political parties and would not follow
his strategy. In short, Yuan’s authority was lessened, and the unification of China seemed to be
unachievable. 147 As for state finances, most provinces resisted turning national taxes over to the
central government. Based on a survey of British and American consular reporting, most
provinces advocated that provincial autonomy should be a basic part of all policies. But from the
point of view of the central government, provincial autonomy and unbalanced provincial budgets
would stop the flow of tax revenue from the provinces. 148
As Ernest Young points out, “In this view, the aftermath of the revolution witnessed a testing
in practice of the two competing ideas of self -government and administrative centralization, that
had been winning adherents during the previous decade. It was a time of energetic political
experimentation. Along with experiment went conflict, as the expansion of political participation
collided with efforts to centralize authority.”149 As a consequence, the gulf between
provincialism and centralism gradually widened and ultimately became unbridgeable. With the
ultimate objective of national independence, Yuan and the central bureaucrats had realized the
most important issue was to gain greater centralized authority in order to achieve the goal of
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national salvation. Therefore, provincialism had become the biggest challenge to the central
government and Yuan Shikai. 150

4.2.3 Extending the Center’s Authority to the Provinces via the Beiyang Army
Even though provincialism, an outgrowth of nationalism and constitutionalism, was derived
from the late Qing reforms and was initiated by the constitutionalists like Yuan Shikai and Liang
Qichao, in the early Republic more and more people realized that provincialism had become a
serious problem since it undercut the authority of the central government. It is important to note
that Liang, who provided a theoretical basis for local autonomy in China, deplored people’s
enthusiasm for provincial autonomy, emphasizing that even the idea of autonomous government
was not limited to provincial units alone.151 Therefore, Yuan Shikai, as the leader of central
government, eventually could not avoid responding to provincialism. The Second Revolution
provided the opportunity for Yuan to carry out his policy of political centralism.
The most direct result of the Second Revolution was that the powerful Beiyang forces took
over most of the provinces, making it possible for Yuan to expand central authority into most of
the country. The Beijing government eventually was able to appoint administrative officials in
the provinces and reverse the nationwide trend, albeit temporarily, toward provincialism. 152 In
contrast to 1912 or the thirty years after his death, after the Second Revolution the central
government’s control of China had reached an unprecedented level. By appointing its own
officials to local posts, Yuan’s government made significant progress toward administrative
integration of the provinces across the country. The changes along the Yangtze River were most
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obvious. By early 1914, two of Yuan’s closed military associates were installed on strategic
points along the lower Yangtze River: Duan Qirui in Wuhan, Hubei, and Feng Guozhang in
Nanjing, Jiangsu. 153 And for the first half of 1915, Sichuan was also under the direct control of
Beijing. In a sense, from the 1911 Revolution until this time, the whole of China was had not
been unified. But now, by mid-1915, Yuan’s central government directly controlled twelve of the
eighteen provinces in China proper (i.e., the historical core of China, excluding frontier regions),
with a total population of about 300 million. 154 With this powerful base, after the summer of
1915, Yuan believed it was time to consider the next step in his political centralism project.
If Yuan Shikai considered himself as just the leader of the Beiyang officials and military
officers, he might well have been content with his 1913 victory. With the suppression of his
opposition, he eventually gained the power to appoint his subordinates to the provinces. If Yuan
and his Beiyang clique had been satisfied with appointing his supporters to take over the original
power structure in the provinces and mobilize a wider range of social forces by providing m ore
opportunities for political participation, the foundation of his regime would have been further
consolidated. But what Yuan pursued was a policy of bolstering central authority by tightening
control over the provinces, which would inevitably affect the interests of the provincial
governors and militarists. As the Beiyang generals who followed him in the Second Revolution
had taken over almost all of China’s provinces, Yuan’s move to deprive provincial leaders of
autonomy amounted to an assault not only on the revolutionaries, who opposed him, but on the
Beiyang generals whom he had trained and led since the Xiaozhan troop training in the late Qing
period.155

Ibid.
Ibid., 142.
155 Ibid., 155.
153
154

60
4.2.4 “Military-Civilian Division” in the Provinces: The Results and Later Appraisal
In 1913, Kang Youwei proposed “abolishing the provinces.”156 “Under the present
threatening circumstances,” Kang wrote, “China’s great cause of concern lies particularly in the
independence of the military governors.” He argued that “the provincial assemblies were
pursuing independence under the guise of self -government,” and that this kind of provincialism
would strip the central government of its raison d’être. 157 In a proposal from the cabinet in
November 1913, Liang Qichao further advocated the abolition of the provincial system, arguing
that the provincial level, standing between the central and local levels of government, should be
removed, and that the orders from the central government should be sent directly to the cities and
counties.158 This undoubtedly was a fundamental solution proposed by the central bureaucracy as
a response to the spread of provincialism.
However, as the leader of the Beiyang clique, Yuan could not support a policy without any
consideration of his subordinates. In order to centralize authority, Yuan could directly challenge
the interests of the gentry class, but he had to be much more circumspect regarding the Beiyang
generals, the base of support for his regime. Also, in view of the widespread social support for
provincialism in the early twentieth century, Yuan believed that the proposal to centralize
authority was too radical and impossible to implement. The bureaucrats in charge of the central
government represented by Liang Qichao and Premier Xiong Xiling (1870–1937),159 expressed
their strong disappointment and dissatisfaction with Yuan’s persistence in maintaining the
provincial-level civilian and military authorities. Yuan’s disagreement later became the main
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reason for the resignation of the Xiong-Liang cabinet in February 1914.160 As the president of the
country and as the leader of the Beiyang clique, Yuan faced a difficult decision. After weighing
the options, he eventually chose a relatively moderate plan, a “military-civilian division” in
provincial power, to implement his political centralism policy.161
Yuan launched his administrative reform plan for the provinces in early 1914, and by summer
the plan was officially announced and began to be implemented step by step. First, official titles
were changed. The provincial “Military Governor” (Du du) was renamed “General in Chief”
(Jiang jun), while the civil governor, who had been known in most provinces as the “Head of the
Civil Government” (Min zhengzhang) was renamed the “Pacification Commissioner” (Xun
Anshi). Behind these name changes was a new division of provincial powers. All civil functions
were transferred from the military governors to the pacification commissioners, i.e., the new civil
governors. The generals who no longer served as the military governors were now responsible
only for the modern national military within the province; even using the old -style troops needed
the permission of the civil governor.162 At the same time, the provincial generals and their troops
were to be incorporated into a national military system administered by a headquarters directly
under the president in Beijing, where the periodic attendance of the generals would be required.
This would weaken the military governors and reduce provincial autonomy, which, if it had been
successful, might have forestalled the regional military autonomy of the warlord era. The aim of
the “military-civilian division” plan was obvious: to separate the civil affairs functions of the
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provinces from the former military governors, who previously exercised full administrative
authority in both military and civil affairs. 163 Under the planned division, then, the new civil
governors would take the leading position in the provinces.
As the president of the country and the leader of the Beiyang clique, Yuan eventually had to
make a choice. Perhaps he thought that he had already chosen a relatively moderate plan,
“military-civilian division,” which he thought would convince his subordinates to follow his
centralization policy. 164 No relevant historical records show that Yuan fully communicated his
intentions to the core members of his group before implementing this policy, nor that any
consensus was reached. However, the Beiyang generals, who had followed Yuan for many years
and had already taken over military and civil power in the provinces, felt they were betrayed by
Yuan, their leader. 165 Thus it was Yuan himself who brought about the division of his Beiyang
clique. Without the support of the Beiyang forces, Yuan’s regime would have no f oundation for
its existence. I suggest that the “military-civilian division” policy set in motion the ensuing
sundering of the Beiyang clique and the failure of Yuan’s subsequent restoration.
The failure of Yuan’s attempt to restore the monarchy ended his centralization policy, and
the restrictions on the provincial military’s influence thereafter never returned to the level before
1911. When Feng Guozhang and other generals had begun to turn against him in 1916, Yuan
returned power over civil administration to his generals, thereby restoring the civil authority of
governors to their pre-1914 levels. Thus, what Yuan had just taken from his subordinates he soon
returned to them. 166 But even so, the generals did not serve Yuan in 1916 as they did in the 1 911
Revolution and the Second Revolution. This, I argue, is the reason the powerful Beiyang Army

Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k’ai, 157.
Ibid., 158.
165 Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, 161–162.
166 Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k’ai, 158.
163
164

63
was helpless in the face of the National Protection Army and its battle to end Yuan’s restoration.
From a certain perspective, the main reason for Yuan’s failed attempt to restore the monarchy
was that Yuan himself first sold out his generals as part of his centralization policy in 1914, and,
in 1915–1916, his attempt to restore the monarchy gave his generals the chance to act on their
own interests and turn against him.167
Some later historians agree with the view of the Xiong-Liang cabinet that Yuan should have
adopted a more resolute plan such as “abolishing the provinces,” which might have eliminated
the possibility of the warlords dominating China during the next period of modern Chinese
history.168 However, even Yuan’s relatively moderate centralization plan, which retained the
provinces as an administrative unit but divided military and civilian power, turned the Beiyang
generals against him. If Yuan had adopted a harsher approach, the consequences may well have
been even more disastrous. In fact, Yuan persisted in his political centralism policy. As Young
concludes, “Yuan continued to pursue lesser versions of centralization and civilian supremacy in
the administrative reorganization of 1914. The goal was a centralized bureaucratic state staffed
by sober men of experience, knowledgeable about both the modern world and old established
ways of Chinese officialdom.”169 From his administrative action in 1914–1915, it can be
concluded that Yuan’s policy of political centralism and civilian supremacy in the provinces was
a firm and long-term strategy.
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4.3

The Failed Bid for Constitutional Monarchy
On December 11, 1915, despite repeated pleas by his closest friends and generals, and the

public opposition by the British and Japanese powers, Yuan “accepted” the invitation of the
National Assembly to become China’s emperor. Yuan’s decision, however, apparently did not
come easily. One of his assistants observed that “he had never seen Yuan, who was given to
making quick decisions, so uncertain and ‘torn with conflicting emotions’ as when he was
deciding for the monarchy.” 170 In hindsight, Yuan’s strategic choices in the early republic—
ending the provincial assemblies and provincial autonomy and resuscitating a centralized
regime—were reasonable given China’s internal and external conditions at that time. If, as Liang
Qichao argued, the restoration had been implemented steadily for the next ten years, Yuan
Shikai’s failure would not appear so stark. 171 Looking back at history, in any case, Yuan’s
restoration of the monarchy left a difficult question for later historians: Why did Yuan risk
changing the existing republican system to restore the monarchy in 1915 –1916?
As to why Yuan made such a reckless choice, the answer remains uncertain. Perhaps Yuan
Shikai himself could not give us a satisfactory answer. Thanks to media reports, Yuan’s words
were widely known across the country. When Feng Guozhang and Liang Qichao went to Beijing
in June 1915 to persuade Yuan not to risk restoration, Yuan definitely denied the rumors that he
had decided to make himself emperor. Yuan said he would never make such a foolish decision.
The only difference between a president and an emperor, he contended, was that the latter was an
inherited position. Throughout Chinese history, it was usually the case that the descendants of
most emperors would become victims when the throne changed. He did not want his descendants
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to suffer such a fate. If someone forced him to restore the monarchy, his only choice would be to
go to England and never return to China. 172
Before the 1980s, many people suggested that the main reason behind Yuan’s decision to
restore the monarchy was his personal ambition.173 Others believed that Yuan was somehow
manipulated into restoring the monarchy, or that his family life played a role, and so on. None of
these suppositions, however, can explain why Yuan Shikai, a pragmatic and prudent politician,
was willing to take such a large risk by restoring the monarchy. As Ernest Young suggests, “But
those who were close to Yuan at the time and have recorded their impressions have not stressed
his vainglory or preoccupation with personal fulfillment. … I can only convey my sense that an
infatuation with images of yellow robes and dynastic splendor was at most a minor factor in his
decision.” 174 Based on what this thesis has examined—Yuan’s experience in the early Republic,
his three influential advisors and their well-known essays, and his quest for political centralism
at both the center and provinces at the time—I argue that it is mostly like that Yuan’s
misjudgment of the situation and his desire to increase support for his centralized policy were the
two main factors that guided his final choice.

4.3.1 Faulty Judgments Led to Opposite Ends
Based on the sources and the fact that Yuan Shikai was an experienced statesman, it is likely
that he accepted the risks of restoring the monarchy after fully considering the pros and cons.
Although it is speculative, I believe his misjudgment of China’s internal and external situation
led him to make what turned out to be a disastrous decision: to restore the monarchy.
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First, after he accepted the final form of the Twenty-One Demands on May 9, 1915, Yuan
repeatedly declared that this outcome was a “national humiliation,” “but let us all remember it
and do our best to wipe out this disgrace.” 175 With his deep concern about the increasing danger
of Japanese encroachments, Yuan hoped to find ways to alleviate the problem. To return to the
monarchy might well have been one of these methods he pondered. Yuan believed that imitating
Britain, Germany, and Japan by embarking on a constitutional monarchy was something that the
foreign powers would recognize and accept, or even approve of.176 Following the example of the
Meiji Restoration, which won wide-ranging sympathy and support from the Japanese, it might
well have been reasonable to assume that the Chinese people would similarly enthusiastically
support a restoration in China. During the First World War, since the Western powers were
unable to counterbalance Japan in China, Yuan wished to divert the attention of the Japanese and
delay the pace of Japan’s aggressive policy. 177 To this point, Yuan was unquestionably naive in
his understanding of Japan. With the Twenty-One Demands, Japan had already changed its
policy on China and come to think of Yuan as the biggest obstacle to its aggressive strategy on
China. After the Twenty-One Demands had been countered by Yuan’s government, Japanese
policy makers believed that removing Yuan Shikai was the top priority in their China strategy.
As Putnam Weale quoted from a Japanese strategic paper, “Yuan Shikai belongs to that school of
politicians who are fond of employing craftiness and cunning. … For Japan to ignore the general
sentiment of the Chinese people and support Yuan Shikai with the hope that we can settle with
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him the Chinese question is a blunder indeed.” 178 Japan wished to use Yuan’s own mistakes to
remove him from the Chinese political arena, and Yuan’s monarchical attempt was a precisely an
opportunity for Japan to overthrow Yuan and his government. Based on ample historical
evidence that Japan’s planning and implementation played a key role in the process of Yuan’s
failed restoration, some recent scholars’ research even points out that Japan’s influence was the
decisive factor in Yuan’s final decision and his ultimate failure. 179
Second, after the establishment of the Peace Planning Society on August 14, 1915, Yuan’s
intentions were clear for all to see. And then, agitation for restoration of the monarchy started. In
particular, the writings of constitutional theorists Yang Du and Frank Goodnow might have led
Yuan to mistakenly believe that establishing a constitutional monarchy was the common
aspiration of elites and the public. As Ernest Young points out, “Yuan opted for monarchy as an
accommodation to popular psychology and as a means of gaining public order and greater power
for the central government.” 180 Yuan might well have thought that public opinion could be used
to mobilize the public to support his centralization policy. After his government abandoned the
gentry class, Yuan needed to find an alternative source of support, one that drew on a wider
swath of society. Just as with the Boxer Movement in the late Qing and other movements in
modern Chinese history, it was not uncommon for the highest authorities to respond to so-called
public opinion by trying to fulfill what they thought was the public’s wishes. But the result was
usually disastrous. Yuan’s restoration of the monarchy was one such case.
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Third, Yuan believed that after the Second Revolution, virtually all of China had come under
the control of his Beiyang Army. This included even the remote province of Sichuan, where he
appointed his trusted confidant Chen Yi (1870–1939) and his Beiyang troops to take over the
provincial and local administration. “By July 1915, Sichuan was also integrated into China’s
centralized administrative system.”181 I speculate that when Yuan formally launched his
monarchical movement in August 1915, he was confident that the Beiyang generals, whom he
had trained in the late Qing period, would support him unconditionally.182 But he ignored the fact
that after his generals had become the military governors of most of the provinces, their own
interests would be harmed by Yuan’s centralization policy. And this inevitably caused them to
change their position and become opponents of Yuan’s strategy. Feng Guozhang, who had been
a protégé of Yuan’s longer than anyone else, would be an obvious example. 183
The above three aspects that contributed to Yuan’s misjudgment of the situation, I argue, led
Yuan to believe that circumstances were ripe for a restoration of the monarchy. And in Yuan’s
view, if the Hongxian monarchy could completely reverse the chaos unleashed by the liberal
republic, he could restart constitutional reform under a centralized government, similar to how
the Xinzheng reform was launched in the late Qing. Unfortunately, the reality of these three
aspects was completely opposite to what he observed. As Liang Qichao described the situation
was at that time, “Internally, the rebels are accumulating strength against an opportune time to
rise; externally, powerful neighbor countries are waiting for an opportunity to harass us.” 184 In
short, it was not time to embark on the long road to social change. Yet, Yuan Shikai did not heed
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the advice of his closest advisors, including Liang Qichao, and his monarchical attempt was
doomed to defeat.

4.3.2 Losing the Support of the Gentry and the Beiyang Generals
The gentry class was the foundation of traditional Chinese society and provided the main
body of supporters of constitutionalism. It played an important role in the national political arena
for many decades. As we can see in the 1911 Revolution, the Second Revolution, and Yuan’s
monarchical restoration, it was the attitude of the gentry that dominated the specific course of
history. Although Yuan Shikai originally considered his strategy from the perspective of
centralizing power and promoting local administrative efficiency, his policy had in effected
locked the gentry out of his regime and pushed them to oppose him. 185 As his attempts to
centralized authority advanced, Yuan Shikai alienated most of his closest friends and erstwhile
supporters, many of whom were members of the gentry.
Tang Shaoyi, a long-time comrade of Yuan’s, was appointed as the first premier of the
cabinet with the assent of the revolutionaries. Because of the power division written into the
Provisional Constitution, Tang inevitably clashed with Yuan, the president, and resigned in less
than six months. Despite their long-term and mutually beneficial relationship, the president and
the premier could not agree on the division of power under the Provisional Constitution. The
resignation of the Tang cabinet disappointed Yuan and caused him to ponder why it happened. In
Yuan’s view, the cabinet system caused these two long-term associates to split. 186 Liang Qichao,
as the leader of the Progressive Party, was the most influential representative of the gentry class.
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However, Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly, thus depriving Liang and his
Progressive Party of their political stage. While Liang Qichao tried his best to persuade Yuan
Shikai not to restore the monarchy, he failed and soon became a firm opponent of the restoration
and a champion of the armed anti-Yuan movement.
The loss of the support of the gentry was a blow that Yuan Shikai might have survived if he
had not also alienated his associates and allies in the Beiyang clique. After Yuan took power in
the early Republic, most important military and political figures of China were affiliated with the
Beiyang clique. Aside from Yuan himself, the most influential members were Duan Qirui and
Feng Guozhang. But in the eyes of these two powerful generals, Yuan’s efforts to strengthen his
centralized authority ran counter to their own interests. This conflict between Yuan and his
generals was the real beginning of the division of the Beiyang clique, which had been the base of
the Yuan regime. When the restoration began, both Duan Qirui and Feng Guozhang had publicly
opposed it. On August 29, 1915, Yuan Shikai relieved Duan of his post as minister of war with
the excuse that Duan was ill. Duan then went into temporary retirement. 187 On December 18,
Yuan Shikai appointed Feng Guozhang the commander-in-chief of the army, but Feng, who was
then in the province of Jiangsu, refused to travel to Beijing, claiming that he was ill. 188 On
December 22, Liang Qichao met with Feng secretly in Nanjing and came to an agreement, which
indirectly encouraged the military to oppose Yuan’s monarchy. On December 25, instigated by
Liang Qichao, Cai E declared the independence of Yunnan, thus publicly challenging Yuan,
which resulted in the outbreak of the National Protection War. 189
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When Yuan ordered the army to suppress the independence of Yunnan, both Duan Qirui and
Feng Guozhang refused to serve as commander-in-chief.190 Furthermore, the provinces of
Guizhou, Guangxi, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Hunan declared their
independence one after another. In March 1916, Feng Guozhang organized several other generals
in the provinces—Li Chun in Jiangxi, Jin Yunpeng in Shandong, Zhu Rui in Zhejiang, and
Zhang Xun in Changjiang—to send a secret telegram calling on Yuan Shikai to abolish the
monarchy for the sake of peace in the country. 191 Even after Yuan publicly announced his
abdication, Duan, who was then the premier, further asked Yuan to surrender all administrative
and military authority to Duan’s cabinet. At the same time, Feng Guozhang organized peace
talks in Nanjing and publicly demanded Yuan’s resignation. Thus, I argue, the main factor
behind Yuan’s failed restoration was the division of the Beiyang clique.
By July 1915, Yuan was already aware of the crisis roiled around him. With the increasing
threat of aggression from Japan, his domestic support was declining among the provincial
governors and the Beiyang generals. The gentry, who originally supported him from the
Xinzheng reform in the late Qing to the 1911 Revolution and the Second Revolution in the early
republic, were dissatisfied with Yuan because their interests had been harmed by his
centralization policy. Enjoying only superficial success, social forces supporting Yuan had
gradually weakened, while the opposing force had gradually become stronger. One after the
other, Yuan Shikai alienated himself from his close supporters and finally became isolated. As
Ernest Young points out, “Yuan was wrong when he thought he could do without this source
[i.e., the gentry] of political energy or some substitute. Indeed, in my view that gentry resentment
at Yuan’s policies after the Second Revolution created an environment where, with the
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precipitating event of Yuan’s monarchical movement in 1915, disaffected leaders could
successfully challenge Yuan.”192 This was the context in which Yuan Shikai made his decision to
ascend the throne.
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CONCLUSION

As a representative of the reformers of late Qing, Yuan originally shared in the beliefs
spelled out in Yang Du’s “National Salvation through Constitutional Monarchy.” In 1911 when
the Qing called on Yuan to send the Beiyang Army to the city of Wuchang to suppress an
uprising there—a rebellion that launched the 1911 Revolution—Yuan made his political position
clear: “If one compares the system of a constitutional monarchy, which restricts the power of a
king, with one or another of the various systems that our people want to try out in China, one
must come to the conclusion that the former is the only lasting solution [of our problems]. … I
fully realize the weight of my duty, and my only objectives are to restore law and order and to
see what plans beneficial to our country are put into practice without mishap. Personal fame and
power are not my concern. … However, my most important concern is the preservation of
China.” He added that political centralization was crucial to preserving the country: “For the
sake of our country, we must establish a strong government at once, because the danger is
mounting day by day.”193 After the founding of the Republic of China in Beijing in March 1912,
Yuan expressed his full support for the Republic, and repeatedly denied the allegation that he
was intent on making himself a monarch. At the very beginning of the Republic, Yuan hoped
that China would bid farewell to the monarchy and, in order to achieve the goal of saving the
country, would welcome the new republican system. 194 However, in March 1916, four years into
his presidency, in his Mandate of the Cancellation of the Hongxian Monarchy, a declaration
announcing the end of his 83-day-old reign, Yuan himself explained why his restoration failed:
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“I cared for nothing, but the salvation of the country. A perusal of our history of several thousand
years will reveal in vivid manner the sad fate of the descendants of ancient kings and emperors.
What then could have prompted me to aspire to the Throne?”195
The preponderance of evidence confirms Yuan Shikai’s words: his restoration of the
monarchy was driven by considerations beyond his personal interests. Yet, it is undeniable that
Yuan’s leadership failed. As Ernest Young points out,
Yuan’s policies had a way of producing the opposite of their intended effect. … An
elaborate campaign of administrative centralization led, though the hostilities it
evoked and the interests it violated, to a greater degree of disunity than China had
experienced for centuries. The monarchy, a device to bind the population to the
government and to ward off Japanese designs on China, alienated Yuan from his
country and provided an opening for Japanese machinations. The efforts to impose
civilian supremacy gave way to a period of unparalleled military dominance. When
one contemplates the human consequences, failure is too gentle a word for Yuan’s
presidency. 196
Considering his original intent and the result, Yuan Shikai’s policy of political centralism and the
establishing constitutionalism through the restoration of the monarchy can be understood not
only as a failure of Yuan himself, but also of the country.
Admittedly, Yuan apparently did little strategic thinking and lacked long-term goals for the
development of the country in the new era of the Republic. In the late Qing, he was just a
bureaucrat working to implement the Qing reforms. Once the Republic was established, all he
could imagine was to return to the original monarchical environment and political structu re in
order implement constitutional reforms. However, in the view of Yuan Shikai and Yang Du,
sustaining centralism and transforming the liberal Republic into a constitutional monarchy were
not personal ambitions or a reactionary response to the march of history, but a necessary step to
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implement their notion of constitutional for the sake of saving the country. In their view,
establishing a strong central government was the only way that China could avoid being carved
up by the foreign powers or being divided by internal provincial forces. However, this eventually
led Yuan Shikai to make a strategic decision—to shift from political centralism to constitutional
monarchy—based on abstract ideas rather than pragmatic realities.
Perhaps Yuan’s plan to restore the monarchy have derived from his despair over the
situation in China as well as his own personal situation. If so, the restoration of the monarchy
was just a desperate gamble of a leader in a demoralized situation. Yuan might have understood
that if he was unwilling to abandon his centralization policy, his ultimate opponents were
precisely his erstwhile supporters—the Beiyang generals, who were provincial military-civilian
governors, and the gentry class, who dominated all levels of representative institutions. What
other social class or group might have supported Yuan’s centralization policy as a response to
the foreign challenges at that time? One can only imagine that Yuan had no answer, for without
the generals and gentry as its foundation, Yuan’s regime could do nothing. That is to say, the
failure of his restoration was doomed before it started.
Yuan Shikai might well have been better served if he had been more sober, first bringing the
situation under control and establishing solid support and then advanced step by step. Yuan’s
quest for centralized authority could not succeed without social support. That is to say, Yuan had
to rely on the gentry class and his Beiyang generals and provincial elites. That required at least
acknowledging their interests and not depriving them of the benefits that they had already
secured. If Yuan had tried, he might have drawn the gentry together into a single powerful
political party, one that could easily dominate the parliament and the government. If that had
been accomplished, then Yuan could have ruled the country in a republican representative
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fashion, pursued centralized authority, and implemented a constitutional transformation. In
hindsight, if Yuan had paused to repair the cracks in his alliance with his Beiyang subordinates
and with the gentry, the result could have been a strategy that ensured Yuan of success and
brought peace and stability to the country.
With the objective of exploring the intellectual background of Yuan’s ill-fated decision, this
thesis has also examined the role of three of Yuan’s influential advisors—Yang Du, Liang
Qichao, and Frank Goodnow—and their well-known writings relevant to the history explored
here. Faced with the interior challenges posed by local powers in China’s provinces and the
exterior pressure by an aggressive Japan, Yuan hastened to agree with Yang Du’s and
Goodnow’s suggestion that the monarchy be restored, not heeding Liang Qichao’s cautionary
advice to advance steadily under the constitutional Republican system for the next ten years.
Yuan Shikai gradually believed there was only one right path for China: a constitutional system
under political centralism. That is to say, the modern transformation of China, from autocratic
system to constitutional system, required a strong central government that could guarantee
national unity and stability. 197
The thinking of Yuan’s advisors reveals that the policy of ending liberalism and
provincialism in the early Republic and centralizing authority as the basis for unifying China and
promoting its prosperity, was not Yuan’s idea alone. Based on the advice of Liang Qichao and
Frank Goodnow, the presidential republican system and the 1914 new constitutio n were put into
practice. The trend of a Western-style liberal representative system and provincial autonomy in
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1912–1913 was halted by Yuan’s program in 1914–1915. Even though Yuan’s restoration was a
disaster both personally and for China, his strategic program of political centralization and the
other policies he implemented in 1913–1914—replacing the National Assembly with the
Political Conference and depriving the provincial military-civilian governors (most of whom
were his own Beiyang subordinates) of their authority—were significant and far-reaching. As
Ernest Young concludes,
It is quite wrong, however, to suggest that the patterns of warlordism were an
intended consequence of Yuan’s policies. … Yuan’s programs during his
dictatorship were designed precisely to prevent this eventuality. He worked for the
assertion of a civilian administration over regional military power, including that of
his generals. … Yuan’s great contribution to the warlord period was his failure to
complete his own programs. 198
Today, more than one hundred years have passed. Yuan Shikai’s failure to restore the
monarchy belongs to the past. But as a case study, his failure to establish constitutionalism
through the restoration of the monarchy might contain lessons for later leaders who are facing
critical decisions. Although Yuan’s restoration of the monarchy was based on a misreading of
the internal and external situation and quickly failed, his and Liang Qichao’s commitment to
political centralism seems to have been reasonable, as is borne out by the history of China in
more recent times. I contend that only through political centralism can China realize
constitutionalism. That history also shows that both Yuan Shikai’s conviction that only through
political centralism could China realize constitutionalism and his actions to establish
constitutionalism, still have meaning for China today. One could go further and speculate that
only with a constitutional government, China can complete its transformation from a semi-feudal
and semi-colonial society into a modern state and embark on the historical stage of long-term
stability and prosperity.
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